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1 Introduction 
1.1 The research question 
The area of arms export controls has slowly evolved from being a tool purely for 
strategic security politics towards recognising the adverse effects of arms proliferation 
on the recipient community. A notion of complicity for the exporting states, moral if 
not legal, in human rights violations committed with their weapons, has been argued 
from peace and human rights activist groups.1 A vague language of human rights has 
materialised in several arms trade agreements written from the mid –90’s onwards.     
 
Norway, a significant arms exporter per capita, is a party to all the relevant 
agreements. Additionally, it is a state with an explicitly stated image as a peace nation 
and human rights defender,2 branding itself as a humanitarian superpower.3 The 
Norwegian peace movement has used these two international roles, as an example of 
contradictory foreign relations, arguing that the role as a major arms exporter is 
incompatible with the role as a humanitarian superpower. This thesis aims to analyse 
the way in which human rights concerns have been and are being incorporated into 
Norwegian arms export policies. Based on this potential contradiction as mentioned 
above, I find Norway to be a very interesting case for such an enquiry.  
 
The theoretical framework for analysing this process is partly based on elements of 
the spiral model developed by Thomas Risse et.al in the book The Power of Human 
Rights. I thus propose the following hypothesis: 
 
The evolving role of human rights norms in Norwegian arms export controls can be 
explained through utilising an adaptation of the spiral model developed by Thomas 
Risse et.al. 
                                                 
1
 For an overview, see www.controlarms.org.  
2
 Recent examples can be found in speeches and declaration from the Minister of Foreign Affairs. An 
article called “Norway as a Peace Nation” written by the minister, Mr. Støre, is available from 
http://odin.dep.no/ud/norsk/aktuelt/taler/minister_a/032171-090580/dok-bn.html, and a speech on 
Norwegian facilitation of peace processes can be found here: 
http://odin.dep.no/ud/english/news/speeches/minister_a/032171-090557/dok-bn.html.  
3
 Branding Norway as a humanitarian superpower is part of the image building strategy of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. Executive Summary: Norway’s Public Diplomacy: A Strategy, available from 
http://odin.dep.no/archive/udvedlegg/01/06/ml10_018.pdf.  
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This model will be discussed, and the relevant elements of it and its main mechanisms 
mapped out in chapter three.    
 
1.2 Literature review 
The literature on the normative rationale behind arms transfer controls is quite sparse, 
and generally originating from the NGO community. It is accordingly somewhat 
proscriptive in nature, focusing mainly on what should be done in order for arms 
exports to be in line with existing norms. Examples of this are various documents 
from the Control Arms Campaign, such as Shattered Lives and Guns or Growth,4 both 
produced by Amnesty International. 
 
The majority of literature addressing the effects of arms trade on human rights is 
limited to discussing small arms, such as the reports published by the Small Arms 
Survey.5 These reports are generally of a descriptive nature. An exception is an article 
by Glenn Mac Donald where the implementation of norms of a humanitarian nature is 
implemented in the discussion on small arms proliferation.6 However, the article is 
limited to the small arms discourse, and does not address normative developments in 
the domestic context. Barbara Frey has written several reports for the UN Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights addressing the effect 
of different aspects of small arms trade on human rights.7 These reports are very 
relevant to this thesis and will be addressed in chapter four. However, they are limited 
to small arms issues and do not address the domestic arms export control context. Ian 
Anthony does address the domestic context,8 however he mainly describes the 
empirical reality of the arms export regulations without analysing the normative 
framework on which they are based. Emanuela-Chiara Gillard discusses the difference 
between legal and illegal arms transfer on the basis of international law, including 
human rights law.9 This is to a limited degree relevant, however she does not address 
                                                 
4
 Both reports are available from http://www.controlarms.org/find_out_more/reports/.  
5
 All reports from the Small Arms Survey are found at 
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications.htm 
6
 Mac Donald, Glenn and Silvia Cattaneo, Moving from Words to Action: Small Arms Norms, 
Development Denied, Small Arms Survey 2003 
7
 Especially E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/37, Progress Report of Barbara Frey, Special Rapporteur on the 
prevention of human rights violations committed with small arms and light weapons, 21 June 2004. 
8
 Anthony, Ian [ed.], Arms Export Regulations, Sipri and Oxford University Press, Stockholm 1991. 
9
 Gillard, Emanuela-Chiara, What’s Legal? What’s Illegal?, in Lumpe, Lorna [ed.], Running Guns – 
The Global Market in Small Arms, PRIO and Zed Books, London 2000. 
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the role of domestic export control in implementing regulations to avoid illegal 
transfers, or indeed whether her concept of illegality is supported by a majority of 
states.    
 
This thesis thus represents a new perspective in the discourse on arms export controls. 
The perspective provided by it is important because arms export controls are a 
domestic concern. A coherent understanding of the changing perspectives on arms 
export regulations must therefore include an understanding of how the normative 
foundation of these regulations evolves within the individual states.   
 
1.3 Definitions 
It is necessary to lay down a precise definition of small arms and light weapons for 
the purpose of clarifying my argument. This is based on the importance that the 
current Control Arms Campaign, a campaign that will be central to my argument, 
attaches to the role of these weapons in human rights abuses. The thesis will not focus 
specifically on this group of strategic goods beyond the chapters discussing the NGO 
campaigns for stricter arms export control.  
 
An authoritative definition is the one given by the UN Panel of Governmental Experts 
on Small Arms in their 1997 report.10 It states, “Broadly speaking, small arms are 
those weapons designed for personal use, and light weapons are those designed for 
use by several people as a crew”.11 This definition also includes any ammunition 
designed for use by these weapons. It should be noted that there is no clear dividing 
line between these two categories, just as the dividing line between SALW and other 
types of conventional weapons is blurred.12 
 
One technical aspect of arms export controls must be clearly defined for the benefit of 
clarity of argument. One way of ensuring domestic control with exported strategic 
goods is by demanding end user certificates from the recipient state. An end user 
certificate is a document which verifies the final recipient of the goods. It may take 
                                                 
10
 UN General Assembly, General and Complete Disarmament, note by the Secretary General, 
document A 52/298, paras 24-26. 
11
 Ibid. Para 25. 
12
 For aesthetic purposes, throughout this paper small arms and light weapons, SALW and small arms 
will be used synonymously unless otherwise stated. 
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many different forms; however it will usually provide information about the state 
organ for which the goods are intended, often including the intended use of the 
weapons. Such certification is recommended by the UN and other international and 
regional organisations as a means for the exporting state to ensure that its goods do 
not reach an illegitimate recipient.13   
 
This thesis is concerned with the implementation of a language of human rights in a 
specific body of laws and regulations, as well as the discourse of arms transfer 
controls. Thus, it is necessary to treat human rights as an abstract concept throughout 
most of the following discussions. This is necessary due to the way in which human 
rights is utilised in the debate which the thesis seeks to analyse. While some attempts, 
as explained in chapter four, have been made to establish the legal nexus between 
arms transfers and responsibility for potentially ensuing human rights violations, this 
argumentation does not dominate the domestic debate about what would be a 
satisfactorily strict arms export regime. Here, the debate is structured in terms of the 
moral validity of exporting arms that may be used for violations by others, or that the 
state cannot control possible re-exports of. Based on this, unless otherwise stated, the 
concept of human rights must be understood in these terms, as signifying a moral 
claim to not in any way facilitate or support potential human rights violations. It will 
then follow that the same must be assumed when I talk about norms in this 
framework.  
 
Norms and norm adherence must be understood in terms of the structure of the debate, 
signifying the moral obligation to go beyond legal obligations to avoid risking the 
potential for Norwegian weapons facilitating human rights violations. A further 
elaboration of the functions of concepts of norms and human rights will be provided 
in chapter three when I define important theoretical concepts. Primarily, the 
incorporation of human rights that this thesis seeks to analyse is concerned with 
human rights as a basis for ethical standards, and legal protection of rights through 
arms export regulations is only one possible outcome of such a process.  
 
                                                 
13
 A/CONF.192/2006/PC/CRP.17, Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference to 
Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and 
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1.4 The campaign to include human rights in arms export controls 
The Control Arms Campaign,14 an ongoing campaign calling among for more human 
rights-sensitive arms export controls, is mainly focused on small arms.15 This is 
founded on the premise that, while weapons of mass destruction and even major 
conventional weapons systems may pose the greatest threat to national security, 
SALW are the weapons that are used for human rights violations on a daily basis.16 
Based on their portability, availability and fairly uncomplicated design, SALW in 
general and handguns in particular lend themselves naturally to purposes of threat, 
intimidation and violent human rights abuses in the hands of official state forces as 
well as paramilitaries and irregular armed groups. In chapter two I will look both at 
the conceptual realm in which arms export considerations and human rights policies 
meet, and at theoretical explanations for the introduction of human rights principles to 
this issue. 
 
The strong focus from NGOs on the issue of arms transfers is relevant also in that it 
provides ample background information on human rights violations committed with 
these weapons. The Control Arms Campaign, a coalition led by Amnesty 
International, Oxfam and IANSA17 have published several reports highlighting the 
diverse human rights-related problems associated by the proliferation and free flow of 
small arms. The report Guns or Growth18 focuses mainly on the effect of oversized 
military expenditures and the availability of small arms on development and 
prosperity in developing countries. In Shattered Lives19, the campaign’s first 
comprehensive report, poverty, individual security and the role for small arms in 
facilitating human rights abuses is addressed and documented.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, Conference room paper 
submitted by the Chairman, p. 9.  
14
 See www.controlarms.org.  
15
 Shattered Lives, The Case for Tough International Arms Control, Amnesty International, Oxfam and 




 IANSA is an umbrella organisation comprising about 500 civil society organisations working against 
gun-related violence. See http://www.iansa.org/about.htm.  
18
 Guns or Growth: Assessing the Impact of Arms Sales on Sustainable Development, available from 
http://www.controlarms.org/find_out_more/reports/.  
19
 Shattered Lives: The Case for Tough International Arms Control, available from 
http://www.controlarms.org/find_out_more/reports/  
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The Norwegian NGO attention paid to the human rights problems associated with 
arms trade in general and the proliferation of small arms in particular has been 
significant, especially since the start of the Control Arms Campaign in 2002. 
However, the inclusion of human rights references in international arms trade 
documents and in the Norwegian arms export rhetoric started significantly earlier. 
This observation is the background for the relevance of examining the explanations 
for this norm implementation in Norwegian arms control regulations. 
 
1.5 Sources and Methodology Introduced 
My first task will be to analyse the different regulations dictating Norwegian arms 
exports. This is necessary in order to map out the position of human rights in this field 
of policy. Assessing the development of this field provides an understanding of the 
process by which the position of human rights norms has changed. This analysis will 
be applied to domestic laws and regulations, international law and agreements, and 
norms to which the Norwegian government has expressed adherence. In accordance 
with my hypothesis, I will assess how the international changes relate to domestic 
changes, and how domestic law may reflect how Norway understands its international 
commitments in the human rights field related to its arms export regulations. The 
analysis of these relationships will be based on a theoretical foundation exploring 
mechanisms of norm adherence, which will be found in chapter three. Thus, the focus 
of this study will not be limited to arms control documents. Human rights law as well 
as other international standard-setting documents of various kinds will also be 
discussed as necessary. These legal aspects will be discussed in chapter 4 to the 
degree that they are able to provide a framework for the following discussion. 
 
I thus do not intend to provide a broad-based or exhaustive legal analysis of the 
potential responsibilities that a state may incur for acts of arms exports to potential 
human rights violators. Rather, I wish to give a brief overview of traditional 
understandings of the scope of international human right instruments in order to 
illustrate the progressive nature of the latest development of the arms control debate. 
This will help the reader understand the context of the Norwegian debate as well as 
providing a broader context in which to understand the process of norm 
implementation.  
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The international texts will form a backdrop against which Norwegian laws and 
regulations will be discussed. These texts will be considered in light of how they 
relate to the human rights concept as it is framed in international commitments, and 
how they appear as an expression of the Norwegian understanding of how human 
rights norms are relevant to their arms export policies.  
  
To get a clearer picture of the Norwegian practice some elements of the argument 
utilises an interview conducted with a member of the Section for Export Control at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The general lack of transparency in relation to arms 
export issues makes such an informal approach likely to be the best means of 
obtaining more detailed information on this practice. The interview was not 
standardised, but tailored to the specific capacity of the interviewee.    
 
1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Thesis 
This thesis is concerned with analysing the process of integrating human rights in the 
Norwegian arms export control regime. In order to adequately address this and to put 
it into a broader international human rights context, I will on two occasions provide 
background information to establish this framework. This is done in chapter three, 
which describes the existing regulatory framework of Norwegian arms export 
controls, including the international commitments that I consider to be of greatest 
significance to the thesis. In chapter four I discuss elements of international law that 
map out the scope of application of human rights treaties. This is done in order to 
illustrate the progressive nature of the arguments for more restrictive arms exports 
control being voiced by the relevant NGO community. I do not intend to provide an 
exhaustive discussion of this field, or to make any conclusions as to the merits of the 
different perspectives. Rather, it is meant as a framework for understanding the 
discussion of norm development that will follow in the last part of chapter four as well 
as in chapter five. 
        
There are a number of international and regional documents that to a greater or lesser 
extent are relevant to the development of the role of human rights norms in arms 
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transfer regulations.20 I have chosen to focus on a limited number of these due to 
limitations of space. The chosen documents are included because they play a key part 
both in the international development of these norms and in their implementation in 
Norway. Instruments not included here are also likely to be of relevance to the process 
of norm implementation, and their exclusion here does not entail a disregard for their 
importance on an international level.   
                                                 
20
 In addition to those that I have chosen to focus on, this includes the UN Programme of Action to 
Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, 
the OSCE Document on Small Arms, the UN Firearms Protocol and several others. 
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2 Theoretical framework 
2.1 The human rights aspect 
It is increasingly legitimate to introduce human rights concerns as a relevant ethical 
standard in international affairs. This can especially be observed in the UN where 
there is a conscious ongoing process aimed at increasing cooperation between the 
human rights bodies and all other bodies of the organisation. It is the nature of human 
rights that they apply to all individuals at all times; this universality is the logic 
behind the trend towards the mainstreaming of human rights in both the UN and other 
relevant policy fora.21 
 
Small arms are used on a daily basis both within and outside of regular armed 
conflicts, and are used by soldiers and police officers, as well as more irregular groups 
and criminals; groups that are often responsible for human rights violations and other 
atrocities. They are often used not just to commit violations, but also to facilitate 
them, in terms of threats and intimidations. This may apply for example to forced 
evictions and transfers of people, violations of rights to liberty and security, and so on.  
 
A number of human rights violations could conceivably be facilitated through an act 
of arms export. I will not discuss this at length, as this topic has been sufficiently 
elaborated in various NGO documents.22 Suffice it to say that state organs such as the 
police or military forces are routinely violating human rights through the use of small 
arms. For these state organs to function properly and efficiently, and in order for them 
to be able to carry out violations of human rights, they need a reliable source of 
ammunition, weapons and spare parts to ensure their ability to perform their tasks 
properly.  
 
                                                 
21
 There are many examples of this. See for example UN Human Rights Instruments document 
HRI/MC/2000/3, Cooperation of Human Rights Treaty Bodies With United Nations Departments, 





 Amnesty International: Shattered Lives and Guns or Growth, op.cit. and other documents from the 
Control Arms Campaign. Additionally, Barbara Frey, the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights 
Violations Committed by Small Arms and Light Weapons has written several reports where this is 
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This point can be illustrated by reference to a particular case study. Philip Verwimp 
discusses the specific weapons used during the Rwandan genocide in 1994.23 There is 
a clear pattern showing who was killed with firearms rather than machetes or other 
less efficient tools and under which circumstances. Due to a shortage of firearms and 
especially of ammunition, these weapons were utilised only when they were thought 
to have the greatest effect or to target specific individuals. More precisely, they were 
used in situations were large groups were gathered in small, enclosed spaces so that 
more bullets were likely to have a lethal effect. Additionally, they were primarily used 
to take out young male individuals that were considered to be more of a threat, and 
more difficult to attack in a direct physical manner.24 The firearms that did exist were 
to a large degree fed to Rwanda by a number of other states.25 These findings show 
how ammunition and firearms are in fact not always as easy to obtain in the right 
quantity and quality. Furthermore, this leads to the more general conclusion that a 
state cannot always expect to be able to obtain all the weapons it may need and want, 
which shows the potential significance of arms export controls. 
 
2.2 Introducing human rights to export controls 
In order to discuss the development of a human rights-sensitive approach to arms 
export controls, it is necessary to establish a conceptual framework within which these 
two issues can interact. A natural starting point is identifying the connection between 
arms exports and human rights violations, which was established in sub-chapter 2.1 
above. The next step is to provide a framework for the analysis of this process that is 
able to identify patterns of norm implementation. This theoretical framework will 
build on a model explaining the process of increasing norm adherence, created by 
Thomas Risse and other authors in The Power of Human Rights.26 In line with my 
hypothesis, I will build on ideas from this model in order to analyse the process by 
which human rights have gained significance in Norwegian arms export policy. I will 
return to the theory after first defining and discussing some important concepts. 
                                                                                                                                            
highlighted.  See especially her preliminary report, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/29, 25 June 2003, as well as 
Frey, Barbara; Specific Human Rights Issues, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/37. 
23
 Verwimp, Philip, Machetes and Firearms: The Organisation of Massacres in Rwanda, Journal of 
Peace Research vol. 43, no. 1, 2006. 
24
 Ibid. p. 19. 
25
 Goose, Stephen D. and Frank Smyth, Arming Genocide in Rwanda, in Foreign Affairs 
September/October 1994 vol. 73 no. 5, p 89. 
26
 Risse, Thomas et.al., The Power of Human Rights. International Norms and Domestic Change, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999 
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2.3 Important concepts 
Some concepts need clarification before we proceed to map out the theoretical 
approach of the thesis. The definitions given here are tailored to the use of these 
concepts in the context of arms export and human rights, and may not cover the full 
scope of their potential applications.  
 
2.3.1 Mainstreaming of human rights 
The concept of the mainstreaming of human rights describes a process of consciously 
incorporating human rights concerns in all relevant policy issues. It is primarily 
associated with the UN and Secretary General Kofi Annan, who introduced the 
concept as a way of emphasising the mutual interdependence of the goals set forth in 
Chapter 1 of the Charter of the United Nation.27 The concept entails a comprehensive 
effort to incorporate human rights concerns in all aspects of the activities of an 
organisation, or for that matter, a country. In other words, it moves away from treating 
human rights as a subject of its own, standing alone as a policy concern, and 
approaches human rights norms as something which are more important as a standard 
of action incorporated in other activities. This concept is relevant for the topic of this 
thesis precisely because it describes a process of norm implementation in policies and 
activities where these norms have not previously been seen as relevant. Addressing 
the process of incorporating human rights concerns in arms export controls is an 
example of such a process of implementation. The concept of mainstreaming thus 
provides a historical and analytical framework for this discussion.   
 
An element of the mainstreaming of human rights is what I brand increased human 
rights sensitivity. This entails a so-called “rights-based approach” to various spheres 
of policy, in this case arms exports.28 Essentially, this means that actions are taken 
with a view, first of all, to protect and promote the human rights of the individuals 
that will be affected by that action. Additionally, it means that the equivalent of 
                                                 
27
 See the web-pages of the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights at Utrecht School of Law, 
http://www.uu.nl/uupublish/homerechtsgeleer/onderzoek/onderzoekscholen/sim/english/research/2049
3main.html, accessed 18.05.2006. 
28
 One good definition, though tailored to development work, is provided by the WHO: “A rights-based 
approach […] Integrates the norms, standards and principles of the international human rights system 
into the plans, policies and processes of development.”, from http://www.who.int/reproductive-
health/gender/rights.html  
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breaking a few eggs to make an omelette, or sacrificing the rights of a few for the 
benefit of achieving a goal, is not an option. The concept of a rights-based approach is 
often associated with development work, but is increasingly used to describe human 
rights mainstreaming, especially within the UN.29 When I use the expression “human 
rights sensitivity” in the thesis, it will reflect this underlying principle of rights-based 
approaches.  
 
2.3.2 Due diligence 
The concept of due diligence is used in several different contexts, including finance 
and criminal law. In this thesis, I utilise due diligence to the extent that it is being used 
in the relevant literature.30 Barbara Frey, the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights 
Violations Committed by Small Arms and Light Weapons, defines due diligence like 
this: “The concept of due diligence is one that requires a State to take positive steps to 
carry out its obligations under international law”.31 It is stronger in nature than a 
general demand not to directly assist in the commitment of a wrongful act or to 
knowingly be passive when one could act in order to directly stop that act. In the 
context of this discussion, due diligence is relevant as a concept which embraces calls 
for human rights-conscious behaviour to go beyond the mere duty to avoid breaching 
or directly assisting breaches of human rights norms. According to Frey’s analysis, 
“states are obligated by general principles of international law to use due diligence 
prevent transfers of small arms that will aid in human rights violations in recipient 
states.”32 This difference between a negative duty to avoid and a positive duty to 
prevent is significant in this context, at is entails a notion of responsibility for the 
effects of an act even if the act in itself is not a violation of the norm in question. This 
notion of responsibility implies that the exporting state in this case would be 
accountable for not showing due diligence, without sharing responsibility for the 
violation committed by the recipient state.33  
 
                                                 
29
 As an example, UNESCO equals their efforts to mainstream human rights in their work with a rights-
based approach, http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=7903&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.   
30
 Of particular relevance are the reports of Barbara Frey, the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights 
Violations Committed by Small Arms and Light Weapons. See especially her preliminary report, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/29, 25 June 2003, pp 10-11.  
31
 Barbara Frey, Specific Human Rights Issues, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/37, paragraph 30 
32
 Ibid. paragraph 22. 
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2.3.3 Complicity 
The notion of complicity will be further elaborated in chapter five, when discussing 
the implications of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts. However, I find it necessary to 
briefly introduce it at this point. It is often traced back to the Nuremberg Principles, 
where Principle VII states “Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a 
war crime, or a crime against humanity as set forth in Principles VI is a crime under 
international law.”34 It has evolved and broadened in scope, as illustrated by 
arguments about corporate complicity in human rights violations, which takes the 
concept beyond the narrow definition of gross violations of humanitarian law.35 
Complicity as a legal concept entails acts of aiding and abetting in the commission of 
a crime. In contrast to the way in which Frey interprets the concept of due diligence, 
complicity implies a level of shared responsibility for the wrongful acts committed. 
As such, complicity may be a fruitful framework for analysing the potential human 
right implications of transferring weapons to a violating state.  
 
2.3.4 Principled idea 
The concept of principled ideas describes the role of an idea as an underlying 
foundation for politics. As Kathryn Sikkink analyses the concept, it does not 
necessarily imply that this idea will trump all other interests in the process of 
policymaking.36 As Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane write, 
“[I]deas influence policy when the principled or causal beliefs they embody provide 
road maps that increases actors’ clarity about goals or end-means relationships, when 
they affect outcomes of strategic situations in which there is no unique equilibrium, 
and when they become embedded in political institutions.”37  
                                                                                                                                            
33
 Ibid. paragraph 39. 
34
 Principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal, ¶VII, 1950, available from http://deoxy.org/wc/wc-
nurem.htm, accessed 24 May 2006.   
35
 See for example Elias, Juanita, and Celia, Wells, “Corporate Complicity in Rights Violations,” in 
Alston, Philip, Non-State Actors and Human Rights, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005, or 
Jägers, Nicola, Corporate Human Rights Obligations: in Search of Accountability, School of Human 
Rights Research Series, Vol. 17, Intersentia, 2002 
36
 Sikkink, Kathryn; The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and 
Western Europe, in Goldstein, Judith and Robert O. Keohane [eds.], Ideas and Foreign Policy – 
Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993 p. 140. 
37
 Goldstein, Judith and Robert O. Keohane [eds.]; Ideas and Foreign Policy – Beliefs, Institutions and 
Political Change, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 3. 
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It does, however, entail that the idea in question will be taken into consideration and 
have a bearing on decision making at all issues and levels. Sikkink’s notion of human 
rights as a principled idea in foreign policy corresponds with a notion of 
mainstreaming of human rights, in that it may be used as an explanatory framework 
for the mechanisms behind the process of mainstreaming. I will utilise this idea in my 
analysis of the process of introducing human rights to Norwegian arms export 
controls. I believe this process to be a part of a general mainstreaming of human rights 
in Norwegian foreign policy that is driven by the relatively strong position of human 
rights as a principled idea in the field of arms export control.   
 
2.4 A process of norm implementation 
Introducing human rights concerns to arms export issues can be considered inherent in 
the process of mainstreaming of human rights. This is a function of the redefinition of 
national interest that started after World War II in which the protection of human 
rights came to be seen as a strategic interest in the promotion of peace and security.38 
This concern is also reflected in Chapter One of the Charter of the United Nations, as 
addressed in sub-chapter 2.3.1 above. This process can be observed trough two 
interrelated phenomena. First, states are starting, at both unilateral and multilateral 
levels, to introduce human rights-sensitive approaches to their policies.39 
 
Second, human rights organisations are expanding their mandates beyond what has 
traditionally been considered human rights issues. An example is Amnesty 
International, which started out solely focusing on the rights of prisoners of 
conscience. Presently, their focus ranges from this to concern with discrimination in 
employment, European states allowing possibly covert CIA prisoner flights to use 
their air space and, of course, small arms proliferation.40  
 
This process of mainstreaming has also been observable in the context of arms export 
regulations. The previously described change in perspectives from looking at arms 
control issues as something of purely strategic interest to an issue related to the effects 
the weapons are likely to have in the recipient countries in terms of social and 
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humanitarian concerns fits this framework. There has been a continued push for more 
comprehensive controls of arms export, especially since the start of the Control Arms 
Campaign. There has also been an increase in political and to a certain degree legal 
commitments through international agreements on common guidelines for arms 
transfer, which I elaborate on in chapter three and four. This development corresponds 
with the position held by human rights as a principled idea, as described above. It can 
also be observed that these commitments have provided activists with the platform 
required to demand further implementation of human rights concerns in arms export 
policies, and perhaps also the change in behaviour towards real recognition of these 
principles. The development of this process in Norway will be the focus of the second 
half of this thesis. 
 
The process of mainstreaming human rights in arms export controls in Norway is still 
at an early stage. The process can be understood as being at the stage of norm 
emergence as discussed by Sikkink and Finnemore,41 in which key figures or groups, 
called norm entrepreneurs attempt to convince policy makers of the need to embrace 
new norms. This will be based on arguments holding that the present situation is in 
some way “unjust” or “inappropriate”. The background for such “inappropriateness” 
will to a large degree be found in already existing norms.42 When I discuss norms and 
processes of norm implementation throughout the thesis, this will be the meaning 
attributed to it. While human rights norms already exist both as legal and political 
norms, the application of these norms to a new area represents a norm emergence. 
Thus, it is essential to differentiate between human rights norms as legal entities, 
which will be the way the concept is used when I discuss existing human rights law 
and human rights norms as they are attempted incorporated in arms export 
regulations, which will be the meaning of the term when this process is discussed.    
 
2.4.1 A theoretical framework for norm implementation 
The process by which norms and ideas are transformed into policy is the subject 
matter of Thomas Risse et.al’s The Power of Human Rights43 in which the authors 
attempt to identify the common traits of the process towards real norm adherence in a 
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   17 
number of states. This work resulted in a spiral theory explaining the mechanisms by 
which rhetorical acceptance of norms- especially if this acceptance includes a change 
in the state’s discursive practice or an official codification of the norm-44 leads to a 
legitimate platform for pressure towards real change, causing the State to be trapped 
in its own rhetoric. The focus of the book is mainly on how a network of national and 
international NGOs and interest groups together with Western states can facilitate 
change in the human rights performance of the target state through dialogue, 
argumentation and so-called “naming and shaming”.45  
 
The model in itself is quite complex, taking into account a number of mechanisms that 
may either assist or limit the effectiveness of the normatively based pressure for 
political change. Rather than applying the model in its original version, I chose to 
focus on a few basic mechanisms. As mentioned above, the model was originally 
tailored to the specific circumstances of explaining democratisation and increased 
respect for human rights in authoritarian developing states. Such a model is not likely 
to be able to explain changing behaviour in relation to one isolated issue in a 
developed, democratic state. Still, the hypothesis of this thesis suggests that the logic 
of norm implementation follows the same basic stages also in democratic states, and 
that the codification provided by Risse et.al. is a highly useful framework for analysis. 
It goes beyond the purely realist approach of state behaviour towards recognising the 
importance of principled ideas and of norm based political pressure.    
 
I thus suggest that the logic of the spiral theory is applicable also at a more general 
level of norm implementation. More specifically, I intend to utilise three basic 
mechanisms of the theory. First, the relationship between rhetorical concessions, 
expectations and pressure for norm adherence appears to be significant to the 
dynamics which the model seeks to explain. Rhetorical acceptance of the validity of 
the norms in question leads to heightened expectations of norm-consistent behaviour 
and as such, if the conditions are right, may lead to real change in policy and 
behaviour through the exploitation by pressure groups of these concessions. Even 
though Risse et.al. primarily focused on human rights norm adherence in the context 
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of authoritarian states moving towards greater openness, democratisation and norm 
adherence, I find the mechanism explained above to include universal features. As the 
development of norms and the understanding of what makes up norm consistent 
behaviour is a feature of Western liberal societies as well as repressive states, I intend 
to test the applicability of the adapted model on a specific situation of normative 
change in Norway. I propose that the logic of rhetorical entrapment may be applicable 
to states in different situations as well, and I wish to test that hypothesis through 
applying it to the process of introducing human rights concerns to arms export 
policies in Norway.  
 
Second, the concept of world time is significant. This describes the international 
climate at the time of the attempted pressure for norm adherence. According to Risse, 
real norm adherence is most likely to occur if the “world time” is characterised by 
progressive efforts and a certain level of attention afforded to human rights 
implementation.46 Risse et.al. deal with world time as different stages of development 
of human rights norms as a whole, assessing whether the timing of the pressure 
towards change was fortunate in terms of existing international attention to the 
subject. My argument is narrower than that of Risse in both space and time, and is 
concerned with developments in a state that is already a member of the so-called 
norm-abiding group. I will thus utilise the concept somewhat differently, looking not 
primarily at the broader climate for human rights norm developments, but at the 
conditions for discussing the specific issue at hand in the context of the states that are 
close allies of Norway. For this reason, I will not discuss world time as such 
throughout my thesis. However the importance of the international climate 
characterising the arms trade control discourse will be expected to hold the same 
significance for the relative success of normative pressure.   
 
Third, the effect of what Risse et.al. brands as naming and shaming47 could be 
significant also in the context of norm implementation in liberal states. Moral 
consciousness-raising in these situations would be tied both to the international 
reputation of a state and to the domestic effect on the public of appealing to the 
national image. As Norway as a state considers prides itself on an image as a “peace 
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nation” and a “humanitarian superpower”, I expect that challenges to this images will 
have a significant effect on the strength of a campaign for norm implementation 
which is in line with these perceptions and expectations.  
 
I expect the applicability of the adapted model to be higher when the norm in question 
is generally accepted to be a principled idea within the respective societal context. 
According to Kathryn Sikkink, a co-author of The Power of Human Rights, human 
rights has evolved into a principled idea in some Western states.48 A principled idea is 
in a sense paradigmatic in that it reshapes what can be considered as the national 
interest. In other words, when a state comes to shape its foreign policy in line with 
human rights, this is not as a result of that state considering human rights to trump 
national interest. Rather, it is a sign that human rights have come to be seen as part of 
the state’s national interest.49 Sikkink argues that this redefinition has been taking 
place in the US and Europe after the Cold War as the dominating strategic interest at 
the time became insignificant.50 This evolution of national interest can, according to 
Sikkink, manifest itself in two ways. Multilateral human rights policies are 
represented as accepting limits to the sovereignty of the state in accepting the 
jurisdiction of transnational human rights bodies such as the Human Rights 
Commission or the European Court of Human Rights over its human rights 
performance.51 External human rights policies are manifested in that human rights are 
seen as a goal in foreign policy.52 In other words, foreign policies are shaped so as to 
promote human rights adherence in other states. Here, the human rights adherence of 
other states is seen as being in the national interest of the first state.  
 
With these theoretical considerations in mind, I will evaluate the Norwegian position 
on the role of human rights in arms export control in light of this understanding of 
norm implementation. I will seek to answer the following questions: Can recent 
developments in Norwegian policies on arms transfers be understood in light of the 
logic of the spiral model? Can the position of human rights in Norwegian arms 
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exports be seen as a representation of the position of human rights as a principled idea 
in Norwegian foreign policy?  
 
3 Norwegian arms export regulations 
In order to satisfactorily address the nature of the development of Norwegian arms 
exports, it is necessary to map out the laws, regulations and principles governing these 
acts in detail. This chapter will focus on a mainly descriptive analysis of Norwegian 
arms transfers, with a limited number of theoretical observations included to 
emphasise the importance of each domestic development to the process that the thesis 
seeks to address. These empirical observations will be utilised in further theoretical 
analyses assessing the development of the law and practice in light of the adapted 
spiral model in chapter five.  
 
3.1 An overview of the foundations of Norwegian arms export controls 
The Norwegian arms export control system is codified under the Act of 18 December 
1987 and subsequent regulations of 10 January 1989, and administered under the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There are also some important official guidelines of 28 
February 1992 describing how the Ministry manages applications for export licences. 
Additionally, there exists within the Ministry unofficial guidelines for the licensing of 
arms exports, but these are not available to the public. Taken together, this body of 
laws and regulations guide Norwegian arms exports, and are responsible for ensuring 
that this particular aspect of Norwegian international conduct is in compliance with 
both international law and official Norwegian standards. 
 
The 1987 law regulating arms exports primarily codifies the principles of mandatory 
official licences for the export of strategic goods, technology and services, in addition 
to providing a framework for penal prosecution arising from breaches of the law. The 
arms export controls are based on a governmental declaration from 11 March 1959, 
which states that “Norway will not allow the sale of arms or ammunition to areas of 
war or where war is immanent, or to countries engaged in civil war.”53  Based on this, 
the Parliament declared on the same day that they confirmed this principle and added 
that whether an export can take place will rely on “a thorough consideration of the 
                                                 
53
 Taken from Stortingsmelding (Report to Parliament) nr 57 1996-1997, p 4 (author’s translation). 
   21 
foreign and domestic political situation in the relevant area. This consideration must, 




The law itself does not include any references to the 1959 declaration, or indeed to the 
principle that it codifies. Rather, the law is concerned with the strategic importance of 
arms exports and on the need for the government to control how Norwegian arms 
exports could improve the military power and strategic importance of other states. The 
main message is that the right is reserved for the king (i.e. the government55) to 
establish certain rules, including the need for special permissions, when goods “that 
may be of significance for other countries’ development, production or utilisation of 
products for military use […]”56 are to be exported. Further, the law constructs the 
framework for enforcement of the law and subsequent regulations, and penal 
provisions associated with breaches of the law. In other words, the specific 
interpretations of which actions will be needed to satisfactorily control the export of 
strategic goods is left to the government to spell out in regulations implementing the 
act, as provided for in the last section of paragraph 1 of the law. 
 
As the 1959 declaration is considered to be the backbone of Norwegian arms export 
policy,57 the regulations incorporated this principle in its foundation. The declaration 
could arguably be said to have the status of customary law, an interpretation that can 
follow from the regular affirmation of the importance of this principle, found in all the 
recent stortingsmeldinger.58 Additionally, the 1992 Guidelines state, when quoting the 
declaration from the parliament of 1959, that “the government considers the decision 
from Parliament to be legally binding, and that the export regulations are in place to 
ensure its enforcement.”59 Thus, the 1959 declaration from Parliament holds the status 
of opinio juris in Norwegian law, one of the elements needed to establish the presence 
of a customary norm. In addition, while there have been some inconsistencies, 




 Due to constitutional custom, the government is referred to as “the king” in Norwegian law, as in 
“the king’s council.” 
56
 Act of 18 December 1987 relating to Control of the Export of Strategic Goods, Services, 
Technology, etc. ¶ 1, section 1. 
57
 Guidelines of 28 February 1992 ¶ 1(1)  
58
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Norwegian practice generally respects this provision, adding the necessary 
requirement of general practice to form a customary law.  
 
There is no reference to human rights in the law, regulations or guidelines. However, 
in a statement from 1997, the government made a formal interpretation of the scope of 
the 1959 declaration. The statement was short and has only been vaguely referred to 
in subsequent Reports to Parliament,60 ascertaining that human rights concerns was to 
be inherent in the considerations made of the political situation in the recipient 
country. “The evaluation of these situations [political context as referred to in the 
1959 declaration] by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs comprises a consideration of a 
number of political questions, including questions related to democratic rights and 
respect for basic human rights.”61 It did not provide any codification of how human 
rights should be protected through the licensing procedures, nor any delimitation of 
which human rights norms were to be relevant for these considerations. 
 
I will next turn to the more specific elements of the existing arms export regime that I 
find relevant to my research question. Some aspects of the enforcement of the 
previously mentioned regulations are important for understanding the potential reach 
of the control mechanisms, and thus the potential for efficiently enforcing soft-law or 
political principles that are important for decisions to grant export licenses. In other 
words, this is where we can illustrate the degree to which rhetorical concessions may 
have led to a stronger change in behaviour towards more human rights-sensitive arms 
export controls. 
 
3.1.1  What is controlled? 
Having established these basic principles of Norwegian arms export control, we must 
turn to the specific subjects of the law. The first relevant question one must ask is 
exactly what the regulations cover. Thus, I must clarify exactly what the “goods, 
technology and services” that the law is set out to control the export of entails. In the 
wording of the law, the target is goods that “may be of significance for other 
countries’ development, production or utilisation of products for military use or that 
may directly serve to develop the military capability of a country, including goods and 
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technology that can be used to carry out terrorist acts.”62 The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs operates with two lists specifying the goods for which an export license will 
be necessary in the case of a transfer. List 1 comprises “weapons, ammunition, other 
military materiel and appurtenant technology,”63 while list 2 deals with “strategic 
goods and appurtenant technology not included in list 1.”64 To further specify this, the 
Ministry has provided a comprehensive list of goods invoking license obligations. 
This part of the export regime is highly detailed, and it is easily accessible to the 
public, showing that the commodities invoking licensing obligations range from the 
obvious, such as rifles and ammunition, to the obscure, for example specific types of 
high-energy batteries to the seemingly harmless such as woollen socks and ski 
masks.65 
 
In line with the starting point of the law- controlling the export of goods of strategic, 
military significance- the lists are solely concerned with goods that have or might 
have a military use. The only exception to this is in the first category of List 1, namely 
handguns. Here, the export control is set out to cover “handguns etc. with military or 
other purposes.”66 Listing a variety of goods that would be covered by the regulations, 
the list is left open-ended with the qualification that weapons covered are any “similar 
instruments firing explosive charges.”67 Examples given include both weapons of an 
obviously military nature, such as machine guns, and more ambiguous goods, such as 
harpoon guns. This inclusion could signify an acknowledgement of the potential for 
these weapons to be utilised in a harmful way, influencing the security situation in the 
country in question and as such having a strategic effect. Exempted from licensing 
requirements are certain types of shotguns meant for hunting, which according to the 
MFA by virtue of their technical design have a limited potential for strategic use. 
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3.1.2  Who are eligible to receive these goods? 
In order to assess the risk involved for the potential facilitation of violations 
associated with a transfer of weapons, the export control section must by necessity 
look to the human rights record of the state in question at the time of the transfer. An 
insight into this aspect of the regulations is thus essential for getting the complete 
picture of the potential for human rights-sensitive arms export in the Norwegian 
system. In the 1992 Guidelines, three categories of potential recipient countries are 
mapped out. The categories refer to whether a state can receive material from both list 
1 and list 2, only material from list 2 or no strategic goods at all from Norway. In the 
Guidelines, the groups are described like this: 
“Country group 1 consists of the Nordic countries and the members states of 
NATO. Additionally, the group comprises other countries that can be 
approved68 by the Ministry as recipients of weapons. 
Country group 2 consists of states that are in an area of war or where war is 
imminent, or countries in which a thorough consideration of the domestic and 
foreign political situation of the relevant area suggests that exports of weapons 
and military equipment should not take place, or states under a UN Security 
Council embargo. 
Country group 3 consists of states outside groups 1 and 2 to which Norway 
does not sell weapons and ammunition, but who can receive other equipment, 
designed or modified for military purposes.”69 
  
The categories are flexible to a degree that makes them rather unpredictable, as a state 
can theoretically move between the three different groups from license application to 
license application. The Export Council is particular in emphasising that they do not 
operate with country lists as such, but with categories in which they place countries on 
a case-by-case basis on the merits of the considerations made in relation to the license 
application.70 What this means is that the categories are not, and are indeed not meant 
to be, tools for determining the eligibility of a state for receiving military equipment. 
Rather, it is a set of categories in which a state can be found after the license 
application has been considered. The categories are thus not country groups as such, 
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but a categorisation of the three different types of outcomes of an export 
consideration. While countries belonging to the specifically mentioned groups, the 
NATO and the Nordic countries, will be permanent members of group 1, Brazil71 and 
Malaysia72 are examples of states that have made appearances in this group.  
 
3.1.3  How does Norway exercise its arms export control? 
The specific methods for applying for licences are of limited importance, and I will 
only quickly mention the essential elements of them.  
 
The regulations apply to all transfers of arms, with a few exceptions. In other words, 
their application is not contingent upon a case of the weapons being bought and sold. 
The main exceptions relate to the transfers of List 2 goods73 for humanitarian 
assistance, return of borrowed List 2 goods, and List 2 goods in direct transit.74 When 
applying for an export licence, the exporter must list the exact nature and quantity of 
the goods, as well as the identity of the buyer and, if different, the recipient. All 
documentations required by the regulations, such as end-user certificates, must be 
enclosed. A licence cannot be transferred from one exporter to another, or used for 
goods or recipients differing from the information required.  
 
3.2 International agreements 
Within the international arms export control regime, there are several texts that are 
specifically important for the position of human rights in the Norwegian arms transfer 
control system. This sub-chapter will address these agreements in light of their role in 
the development of this relationship, looking at what they represent in terms of 
rhetorical concessions and behavioural change.   
 
3.2.1 OSCE 
There are two documents under the auspices of the OSCE that are relevant to this 
discussion. Firstly, and primarily, there’s the OSCE Principles Governing 
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Conventional Arms Transfers of 1993.75  Additionally, there is a document of 24 
November 2000 called the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons. This 
document has been important in many aspects, not least as a standard-setting 
codification of the specific issues associated with small arms that would gain 
importance with the Control Arms Campaign. However, it is of limited importance for 
this discussion for two reasons. First, it does not bring any new or stronger 
codifications of the link between arms transfer and human rights commitments than 
what had already been stated in the OSCE principles or especially the EU Code of 
Conduct for Arms Transfers, which will be discussed below. Second, the specific 
focus on small arms makes it somewhat less relevant for the discussion at hand. 
Norway is not primarily a small arms producer, and the discussion of human rights 
norms in export controls is framed in a more generalised language. Thus, regardless of 
the importance attached to small arms by several NGOs, I chose not to include this 
document. 
 
The OSCE principles were the first multilateral arms control document signed by 
Norway that expressly called for the human rights situation in the recipient country to 
be taken into account when a transfer is considered. It is only a politically binding 
document of reasonably weak language, which can be explained by the fact that it is 
an early effort in this field. Norway as well as all parties to the OCSE is a party to the 
document without the need for further ratifications. 
 
The OSCE has no enforcement mechanism other than through meetings and 
diplomatic communication. However, there does exist a general call for information 
sharing inherent in the Principles, which facilitates communication between the States 
Parties on their domestic implementation of the document.76 This information sharing 
may have the function of strengthening norm adherence through peer criticism and 
pressure. However, the secret nature of this reporting system causes it to be of limited 
value for this analysis, as the exact content of the reports cannot be accessed. For the 
most part, the document thus becomes a statement of intent and good will, but not 
something that the state needs to make any specific moves to adjust to other than what 
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may be achieved through peer pressure based on reactions to inadequate regulations 
that may be exposed in the reports.  
 
Additionally, the language is of a rather weak character when it comes to the elements 
dealing with human rights. In chapter 4 section (a) (I), it holds that a state should 
“take into account” the human rights situation in the recipient state before making a 
transfer.  No codification of human rights or references to relevant human rights 
instruments is made, which keeps the formulation open for interpretation at a 
reasonably wide discretion of each state. In chapter 4, section (b) (I), the language is 
somewhat stronger, as it holds that states will not make the transfer if there is a 
likelihood of the weapons being used for human rights violations. Still, the lack of 
codification both of how one is to understand the likelihood of these weapons being 
used and the general nature of the wording of the paragraph prevent this from being 
seen as calling for any specific changes in state behaviour. This apparent weakness in 
the potential influence of the document suggests that it represents a rhetorical 
concession in the terminology of the theory used in this thesis. The lack of 
enforcement mechanisms and other control mechanisms such as specific and 
transparent reporting duties supports this understanding. However, the position of 
human rights in the document is significant as it ties the spheres of human rights and 
arms transfers together.  
 
I regard this document as an initial sign of the position of human rights as a principled 
idea gaining ground in foreign political considerations in Europe in general, and also 
in Norway. It represents a development of this process in that human rights is 
introduced to a new aspect of foreign policy, namely arms transfer controls. As such, 
this observation may stand as a criticism of Sikkink’s discussion of principled ideas. 
While it recognises the fact that the idea will not always be of primary importance in 
all considerations, Sikkink does not provide any arguments for the development of the 
position of an idea in the broader field of foreign policy. While human rights have, as 
she correctly points out, been in the position of a principled idea in Western European 
foreign policy for decades, it has not been dominant or even relevant to all aspects of 
this field. The development of the rationale behind arms transfer policies towards 
including human rights criteria, as a representation of national interests, needs a more 
process-oriented approach than that provided by Sikkink. The process of 
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mainstreaming in my view is precisely a process of introducing a principled idea to an 
increasing number of spheres of policy.    
 
3.2.2 The EU Code of Conduct for Arms Transfers 
The EU Code of Conduct may well be the most ambitious and far-reaching document 
codifying ethical considerations relating to arms transfers. It lists eight criteria related 
to the situation in the recipient country, which ought to be considered before a transfer 
may take place. These criteria relate to international law, human rights and adherence 
to international resolutions and sanctions. At first glance, the Code of Conduct 
appears to be quite radical in the way it incorporates human rights concerns in the 
arms export agenda. It does not only call for a consideration of the human rights 
situation in the recipient country, but also proscribes a positive obligation not to 
transfer if there is a clear risk of the goods being used for violations. 
 

































In Particular, Criterion two calls for an assessment of the human rights situation in the 
recipient country. This assessment will inform the decision to grant or deny an export 
CRITERION TWO 
The respect of human rights in the country of final destination 
Having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles 
established by international human rights instruments, Member States will: 
 
a) not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed 
export might be used for internal repression;  
b) exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-
case basis and taking account of the nature of the equipment, to countries 
where serious violations of human rights have been established by the 
competent bodies of the UN, the Council of Europe or by the EU.  
 
For these purposes, equipment which might be used for internal repression 
will include, inter alia, equipment where there is evidence of the use of this 
or similar equipment for internal repression by the proposed end-user, or 
where there is reason to believe that the equipment will be diverted from 
its stated end-use or end-user and used for internal repression. In line with 
operative paragraph 1 of this Code, the nature of the equipment will be 
considered carefully, particularly if it is intended for internal security 
purposes. Internal repression includes, inter alia, torture and other cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, summary or arbitrary 
executions, disappearances, arbitrary detentions and other major violations 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant 
international human rights instruments, including the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. 
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licence based on a consideration of the possibility that the exported goods will assist 
in the commitment of human rights violations. The criterion lists a number of 
violations as examples of internal repression, it includes “torture and other cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, summary or arbitrary executions 
[…]” and a number of other human rights violations generally considered to be 
“serious violations”. The list it left open-ended, and closes with the words “and other 
major violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant 
international human rights instruments […]”. Usually, an open-ended list of this kind 
is considered to be a positive feature by lawyers of a reformist leaning. However, the 
code of conduct may represent an exception to this tendency. While an open-ended 
list may be preferred to a closed one, the qualification “major violations” has the 
potential to cause some concern, given that human rights texts do not clearly state 
which violations are to be included in this category.77 
 
While the Code of Conduct may be of a somewhat stronger wording than the OSCE 
Principles, it is still important to note that the demands put on the participating states 
are to a large degree based on them exercising their discretion in determining each 
situation of arms exports. While Criteria Two, as mentioned above, calls for a state 
not to transfer if there exists a “clear risk” for the goods to be used for internal 
repression, this is not as strong as it may appear. First, there is the situation of “clear 
risk”. It is left to the participating state to determine what constitutes a “clear risk.” 
Second, this clear risk must be directly connected to the proposed transfer. Thus, 
establishing the fact that there is a deteriorated human rights situation in the country is 
not sufficient. For a transfer to be in breach of the Code the state would need to have a 
knowledge of the exact use to which the weapons were to be put. The Code does not 
call specifically for the use of end user certificates, though it has been argued from 
NGOs that this would be necessary to ensure that the state has the information it needs 
for making these decisions.78 
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The Code does concern itself with the risk of diversion of arms, both within the 
recipient state and to ineligible recipients beyond its borders. Criterion 7 specifically 
lists four criteria to assist the exporting state in determining whether there is such a 
risk of diversion. These are: 
A) The legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient 
country, including any involvement in UN or other peace-keeping activity; 
B) The technical capability of the recipient country to use the equipment; 
C) The capability of the recipient country to exert effective export controls; 
D) The risk of the arms being re-exported or diverted to terrorist 
organisations (anti-terrorist equipment would need particularly careful 
consideration in this context) 
An interesting observation is that there is no need for the exporting state to consider 
the history of arms exports of the recipient state. While it does call for a consideration 
of the ability of that state to exercise effective export controls, it does not give any 
guidelines as to what these controls should consist of. As arms export controls are 
utilised as a strategic tool, a recipient state may well have an excellent export control 
in terms of efficiency, but operating on significantly different criteria than those listed 
in Criterion two. It is thus reasonable to suggest that a call for end user certification 
would be a way to ensure that the exported goods are not re-exported to an 
undesirable end user. However, this is only a possibility, not a demand within the EU 
Code.  
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4 Debating jurisdiction and the relevance for human rights norms in 
arms export controls  
 
4.1 The relevance of the concept of jurisdiction 
The development of the arms transfer control debates entered a new phase at the start 
of the new millennium, in which the arguments for human rights-based export 
controls appear in a legal, or at least pseudo-legal, form. This phase is dominated on 
the NGO side by the international Control Arms Campaign, and on the UN side by the 
reports published by Special Rapporteur Barbara Frey. It builds on developments in 
the conception of the scope of responsibility in international law. Arguments about the 
effects of arms trade on social and humanitarian conditions in the recipient countries 
are increasingly framed in a language of human rights, relying on an expanded 
understanding of the scope of responsibility under human rights law.  
 
This chapter will address elements of international law and developments in that 
sphere, which serves to highlight how the role of human rights norms in arms exports 
regulations may be perceived. Highlighting examples of how the scope of 
responsibility has been understood in legal texts and interpreted by legal bodies serves 
as a foundation for understanding the evolution being observed in the more recent 
developments. By looking at law and practice as well as the arguments put forth by 
these actors, I will illustrate the debate about to which degree a state can be held 
responsible for the results of its actions beyond its own borders. This draws up a 
framework for how international law could conceivably be interpreted as giving 
strong moral guidelines for what constitutes legitimate arms transfers.  
 
4.2 The traditional view of jurisdiction in human rights instruments  
Essentially, differences in interpretations of the relevance of human rights law for 
arms exports has to do with how one understands the scope of the conventions, more 
specifically how broad the jurisdiction of these instruments are in terms of extra-
territoriality. This sub-chapter addresses articles dealing with scope of responsibility 
in a few selected human rights instruments in light of their relevance for addressing 
acts of arms export. I fill also briefly address an application to the European Court of 
Human Rights which sought to hold a state responsible for its arms transfers. 
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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was the first human rights document 
completed under the auspices of the United Nations. As a declaration, it wasn’t 
intended to be legally binding; rather, it came to make up the foundation of 
subsequent human rights legislation formulated in the organisation. The two main 
human rights Covenants were considered to be the legal expressions of the principles 
found in the Declaration. Nevertheless, there are discrepancies between the 
Declaration on the one hand and the two Covenants on the other. This is part of the 
reason why the document has retained a certain legal relevance in its own right. Based 
on the significant status of the Declaration, many of its provisions that didn’t find 
their expressions in either of the Covenants are increasingly considered to be norms of 
customary international law. Many even claim that this is the status of the whole 
document as such, based on its strong normative bearings79.  
 
Jurisdiction is generally not discussed in the Declaration, which is only reasonable as 
it is a declaration codifying moral standards, not a document meant for legal use. 
Article 30, however, can be read as having relevance for the debate at hand:  
“Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, 
group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act 
aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.”  
 
This formulation is interesting precisely because it doesn’t mention jurisdiction, but 
rather expresses a universal duty not to act contrary to the declaration. This is a duty 
not only upon states, but also upon all other actors capable of acting contrary to these 
principles. As a principled formulation, this is extremely strong. One limitation must, 
however, be pointed out. The article indisputably introduces a necessary criterion of 
intent for an act to be covered by it. At first glance, this may be reasonable. If there is 
no wrongful intent, if the act is so to speak an accident, it may seem unreasonable to 
be held accountable for it. The problem with this formulation however, is that it 
strongly holds that the act in question must be aimed at destruction of the rights. This 
is a very strong qualification indeed. Most acts that violate human rights do so as a 
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means to an end, not as an end in itself. In fact, this formulation seems to remove the 
responsibility of the actors to have a human rights-sensitive behaviour. 
 
The international bill of rights, or more precisely the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, serve as a starting point for mapping out the concept of jurisdiction in human 
rights law. These were the first legally binding international human rights instruments, 
and they form the basis from which most subsequent work in this particular area 
flows. The articles of these conventions mainly focus on the state as a duty-bearer 
towards individuals under its jurisdiction. Article 2(1) says, “Each State Party to the 
present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant”. 
This article has been the subject of some discussion, especially considering the 
formulation “within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.”80 Does this mean that 
jurisdiction is strictly territorially defined, and that a state is only responsible for the 
rights of individuals on its soil? Why mention the concept of jurisdiction at all if the 
scope of the covenants was to be understood in territorial terms? It is conceivable that 
this formulation is intended to limit the responsibility of states for foreign diplomats 
on their territory, as these will be under the jurisdiction of their home states. 
According to Nowak81 however, the main reason for this formulation was to avoid the 
responsibility of states for individuals that were under their jurisdiction but not 
present on their territory, as such situations were usually dealt with through 
diplomatic channels.82 
 
In the European Convention on Human Rights, the corresponding article reads as 
follows: “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of this Convention.” It is not 
clear whether the lack of reference to the concept of territory as compared to the 
article in the Covenants is significant in this context. It can be argued that this has no 
function beyond avoiding confusion as to the importance of territory, which in itself is 
a clarification worth making. Still, the significance of both these articles is the need 
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for jurisdiction to be established before a state is responsible for protecting the human 
rights of the individuals in question. The European Convention can arguably be said 
to hold greater significance for the potential of holding a state responsible for acts 
outside of its territory as long as jurisdiction over the area in question can be 
established. This will mainly apply to situations of occupation if the article is 
interpreted in a strict manner. This article and its interpretation is the main point of 
contention in the Bankovi case, which will be discussed in the next sub-chapter.     
 
4.2.1 The Tugar admissibility case 
In a 1993 application, the ECtHR pronounced on the admissibility of a complaint 
launched by an Iraqi citizen against Italy for the failure of the latter to introduce 
regulations preventing arms transfers to states such as Iraq. In 1993, an Iraqi mine-
clearer named Tugar filed against Italy after having lost a leg stepping on a mine of 
Italian origin earlier that same year.83 He claimed that Italian failure to protect him 
from life-threatening injuries by way of effective arms transfer regulations amounted 
to a violation of the applicant’s right to life under Article 2 of the convention. The 
commission84 summarily dismissed the application, mainly based on the argument 
that the distance was too great between the act committed by Italy (the transfer, or 
rather the omission to instate effective export regulations) and the violation (the injury 
caused by an indiscriminate weapon). It stressed that no Italian authorities were 
involved in the violation committed against the applicant, given that the mines were 
placed on Iraqi territory by the Iraqi authorities.85 The applicant argued, as I have 
done above, for the similarity between arms transfer situations and situations of 
extradition, which in certain instances evokes Convention obligations even though 
there does not as such exist any right not to be extradited. The commission however, 
dismissed this argument, holding that the Italian failure to regulate its arms transfers 
was “too remote” to invoke responsibility for the injury caused by the mine.  
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4.3 Emerging interpretations based on the ILC Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility.  
A document by the International Law Commission, which was ratified by the General 
Assembly in 2001, attempts to codify the scope of state responsibility for breaches of 
international law. This document has come to be an important justification for writers 
arguing for a broader scope of responsibility in international law generally, and also 
especially for those arguing for greater accountability in arms transfers.86 Discussing 
this document is thus important in order to frame the process by which human rights 
has gained influence in the discourse on arms transfer controls. 
 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts represents 
authoritative interpretations of the scope of responsibility of states under international 
law. Two articles are of great importance to the present discussion. Article 16 tries to 
define the responsibility incurred by a state if it aids or assists the commission of an 
“internationally wrongful act”, which is held to apply if 
(a) “The State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the 
internationally wrongful act; and 
(b) The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that state.”87 
What this article in effect is addressing is the scope of the concept “complicity in 
human rights violations,” as discussed in chapter 2. 
 
Article 41(2), on “particular consequences of a serious breach of an obligation under 
this chapter” might in some instances be more relevant to acts of arms transfer. 
“No state shall recognise as lawful a situation created by a serious breach 
within the meaning of article 40,88 nor render aid or assistance in maintaining 
that situation.” 
 
This work has the potential of being the “missing link” between positions advocating 
absolute responsibility for every involvement in a situation of breaches of 
international law and those arguing from the stricter interpretation of responsibility in 
terms of the jurisdiction of the state in question. In Human Rights law particularly, 
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this document has the potential of clarifying some of the gaps between the morally 
perceived responsibility for human rights violations and the actual legal 
responsibilities incurred. Herein lays the importance of this evolution and 
reinterpretation of international law for understanding the human rights implications 
of arms exports. As the previous discussion of the existing approaches to jurisdiction 
in human rights instruments has shown, this approach falls short of taking into 
consideration the possibility of incurring responsibility for the adverse effects of a 
state’s arms transfers. A potentially more viable approach may be through the concept 
of complicity and obligations to exercise due diligence in international relations, as 
laid out in chapter three. The existence of an authoritative document on which such 
responsibility can be argued can add necessary weight to pressure for more human 
rights sensitive arms export regulations. As will be shown, the NGOs involved in this 
debate tend to take State responsibility further than what this document allows for, 
which may be significant for future developments. This will be discussed further in 
sub-chapter 4.4 and chapter 5. The present section aims at mapping out some elements 
of the ongoing discussion on complicity in international crimes, as they may be 
relevant for the act of arms exports in relation to human rights.  
 
What is the value added of utilising the complicity approach to tie the concept of 
human rights to the state action of arms transfers? It has already been shown in sub-
chapter 4.2 that most traditional and authoritative interpretations of jurisdiction in 
international human rights instruments fall short of being relevant for acts of arms 
transfers. However, it is equally clear that certain arms transfers are able to facilitate 
violations of these treaties, leaving a lacuna between the moral understanding of 
human rights as codified in the treaties and the legal accountability of states for acts 
that are contrary to these principles. Using the concept of complicity in violations of 
international law to understand the scope of responsibility incurred by states through 
arms transfers is one way of attempting to fill this lacuna, narrowing the gap between 
the existing legal protection of human rights and the need for accountability from all 
actors involved in human rights violations.  
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4.3.1 Discussing complicity in the context of arms transfers                                               
The Economic and Social Council appointed Barbara Frey Special Rapporteur on the 
Prevention of Human Rights Violations Committed with Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in 2002 by resolution 2002/25.89 Her subsequent reports have highlighted 
the empirical and legal connection between human rights abuses and small arms and 
light weapons, including the link between such violations and the act of arms 
transfer.90 She uses the ILC Draft Article 16 as her framework for clarifying the 
responsibilities of the arms exporting state for human rights abuses committed with 
their weapons. In her preliminary report of June 2003, Frey contrasts the approach of 
the ILC with the previously discussed due diligence understanding91 of state-
responsibility for human rights violations committed by private actors.92 In Frey’s 
view, the due diligence approach is preferable as it goes further in accepting that 
human rights violations can take the shape of negligence and omission to act.93 
 
Her focus on the importance of the initial, legal transfer allows for a line of argument 
focusing on the responsibility of the state in a way that is difficult to achieve through 
the focus on illicit transfers which has been prevalent in the UN context.94 The act of 
transferring weapons, or more specifically in this context, small arms and light 
weapons, cannot be exercised without taking into account the unique nature of these 
goods. As she somewhat simplistically holds, small arms are the tools used to violate 
human rights.95 Even though this is a somewhat polemic statement given that on the 
one hand, human rights can be violated without small arms and on the other, small 
arms have uses which are not connected to the violation of human rights, it still makes 
one very important point. Weapons cannot be treated as any other commodity as they 
have a greater potential for harm and for being utilised in breach of international law 
than most other categories of commodities in the world. Thus, the potential effect of a 
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choice to transfer arms could be so severe that the exporting state cannot be relieved 
of all responsibilities for the ensuing wrongful act.  
 
This understanding of the obligations associated with arms transfers clearly runs 
counter to and indirectly challenges the reasoning of the European Commission on 
Human Rights in the Tugar v. Italy admissibility case. Looking to a combination of 
the ILC Draft Articles and the notion of due diligence in international affairs, it is 
hard to sustain the argument that the act of arms transfer is “too remote” to incur any 
level of responsibility for subsequent human rights violations. While the commission 
is right in pointing out that all acts directly connected to the violations were those of 
Iraq, the Italian state played a facilitating role in allowing for the transfer. According 
to the principle of due diligence, international acts should be taken after a careful 
consideration of the facts relevant to it. Exporting mines of an indiscriminate nature to 
a regime infamous at the time for human rights violations in general and collective 
punishment in particular, which again is a crime under the Geneva conventions, can 
hardly be justified after such a “careful consideration.”          
 
In an article published in the International Review of the Red Cross, Alexandra 
Boivin argues for the respective uses of article 16 and article 41(2) of the ILC Draft 
Articles in connection with the act of arms transfer. Based on the comments and 
clarifications published by the ILC itself to guide the interpretations of the document, 
she argues against focusing solely on article 16, as the Special Rapporteur tended to 
do in her first reports96 due to the necessity of intent inherent in that article. While this 
criterion may not be obvious upon reading the document, it is clearly spelled out in 
the above-mentioned comments. They hold that for an act of aid or assistance to be 
covered under this article, it must be made with intent to do so.97 This criterion is 
additional to the necessity of the acting state being aware of the circumstances making 
the act of the other state internationally wrongful.98 Boivin criticises this based on the 
same logic as the previous criticism of Article 30 of the UDHR, namely how acting in 
breach of international standards will hardly be an end in itself. When it comes to 
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arms exports, the exporting state will in many if not most instances make the transfer 
based on economic incentives. As Boivin points out, it would be an oversight to 
disregard the lucrative aspect of arms deals in this context.99  
 
The problem of the necessity of intent could make Article 41(2) more relevant for 
arms transfer situation.  
Article 41: Particular consequences of a serious breach of an obligation under this 
chapter […] 
(2) No state shall recognise as lawful a situation created by a serious breach 
within the meaning of Article 40, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining 
that situation.   
Initially, it seems a less tempting option than utilising Article 16, as Article 41(2) is 
only relevant in cases of serious breaches of peremptory norms in international law. 
This will usually be taken to include crimes of aggression, slavery, genocide, torture 
and so on,100 and only applies to situations that are systematic, widespread or 
particularly gross. While this limits the situations under which the article is 
applicable, it introduces a much wider understanding of the concept of complicity 
once the situation is grave enough. If applied to an act of arms transfers, this article 
could cover all transfers made to the violating state, regardless of intent. Additionally, 
and importantly, it could include not only transfers of weapons that made the 
wrongful act possible, but also any act that helps sustain it. Clearly, in a situation of 
grave breaches of peremptory human rights norms, all transfers of weapons could be 
seen as assistance in maintaining the wrongful situation. This is mirrored in the 
rationale for UN arms embargoes, in which states are called upon to stop all 
shipments of arms and military equipment to the state in question in order to put 
pressure on that state to cease its unlawful activities.  
 
In relation to this, it is important to note that the article also addresses the 
unlawfulness of recognising such a situation as lawful. Initialising or continuing 
transfers of weapons could clearly be interpreted as a recognition of the situation as 
unproblematic, or at least as of no concern to the exporting state.  
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In my view this logic could in fact be expanded in most situations covered by this 
article to be relevant for any transfers of strategically important goods. While these 
goods may not be directly involved in the human rights violations as such, they play a 
role in maintaining and strengthening the state body committing the violations. 
Continued transfers of strategic goods not necessarily involving weapons as such, but 
components, technology, radars and so on could also be seen as a failure to recognise 
the wrongfulness of the situation in the receiving state. I also argue that this logic is 
applicable at a broader level. The duty not to assist in the maintenance of 
internationally wrongful acts invokes the responsibility to exercise due diligence in 
international affairs. This cannot be limited to direct transfers, but should also include 
responsibility for taking the appropriate measures to assure that the state doesn’t 
indirectly give such assistance. This could be argued as a case for a functioning 
system of end-user certificates in the transfer of strategic goods to ensure to the best 
of the state’s capacity that their weapons are not re-exported to a state involved in 
such violations. The responsibility of states for the use of their weapons and strategic 
goods can’t be unlimited, and should only be relevant for situations in which the state 
could realistically have acted to limit the possibility of their transfers having the effect 
of assisting the commitment of an internationally wrongful act. If this logic is 
accepted, the efficient and universal use of end-user certificates including some level 
of monitoring appears to be a readily available tool for ensuring the exercise of due 
diligence in acts of arms transfers.  
 
 
4.4 Perspectives of the NGO community 
The Norwegian arms trade debate has, with a few exceptions, been following the 
international one as introduced in sub-chapter 1.3. Some attention was being paid to 
problems of transparency and issues of the lack of end user controls from the mid-
90’s, though from fairly marginal groups.101 In the contemporary context, the 
prevailing NGO approach to arms transfer controls, internationally as well as 
domestically, has primarily been concerned with mapping out the problems related to 
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proliferation of small arms, especially in third world societies. Reports have been 
written to argue for the link between availability of weapons, insecurity and 
development, emphasising statistics illustrating the opportunity cost to development 
represented by extensive arms procurements.102 Additionally, state responsibilities not 
to contribute to human rights violations or other breaches of international law have 
been held by NGOs as somewhere between a moral and a legal obligation.  
 
The Arms Trade Treaty is the brainchild of a group of Nobel peace laureates with the 
expressed goal of limiting future occurrence of violence and war through an 
international standard on arms trade.103 The Control Arms Campaign, a cooperative 
effort between Amnesty International, Oxfam and IANSA later picked up the 
initiative. The Control Arms Campaign holds that the establishment of an 
international legally binding Arms Trade Treaty based on existing legal obligations is 
the preferred means to alleviate suffering and structural problems arising in particular 
from small arms proliferation.104 These concerns are also recognised in reports 
published by the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey. The authors of a publication 
titled Humanitarianism Under Threat: The Humanitarian Impact of Small Arms and 
Light Weapons present statistics and other findings demonstrating varying 
humanitarian consequences of small arms abuse, including the threat posed to basic 
human rights.105  
 
The Arms Trade Treaty takes the connection between human rights and arms transfers 
further than any previously existing document. Still, it claims as one of its 
fundamental strengths that it is built on existing legal obligations.106 As was discussed 
in sub-chapter 4.3, this understanding of “existing obligations” relies crucially for its 
legitimacy on the work of the ILC. The subsequent Campaign in its turn has relied on 
the way Barbara Frey has formulated and clarified the role of these Draft Articles in 
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making a connection between existing human rights obligations and issues of arms 
trade.107 It has been a common feature of most of the NGO rhetoric that it builds on 
already existing obligations, or, as will become apparent, on what they interpret to be 
existing obligations.   
 
The main features of the proposed Arms Trade Treaty are concerned with domestic 
control over the export of arms through licensing procedures.108 It goes further than 
calling for a halt in exports that may directly contribute to violations of human rights 
or other aspects of humanitarian law in at least two ways. First, it addresses the 
responsibility for the original exporting state for transfers that are likely to be diverted 
and used for such purposes.109 This has by Norwegian NGOs been translated into a 
demand for end user certification for all transfers, challenging the Norwegian policy 
of not making such demands on allies. Second, the document in a somewhat weaker 
wording calls for a consideration of the general situation in the recipient country, or in 
countries that they may be diverted to. If the transfer is likely in a deteriorating way to 
affect levels of violence, political stability or sustainable development, “there shall be 
a presumption against authorisation.”110  
 
5 The Process of human rights norm implementation in Norwegian arms 
exports 
5.1 Tracing the norm implementation process 
One of the major arms transfer control activist groups in Norway is and has been 
Norges Fredsråd (Norwegian Peace Council, usually referred to as NFR), which is an 
umbrella organisation covering 28 Norwegian peace organisations.111 This 
organisation dominated the Norwegian arms export control discourse until among 
others Amnesty International Norway and Norwegian Church Aid initiated their 
campaigns in 2005. Amnesty International Norway had discussed the arms trade issue 
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as early as 2003,112 however no significant campaigning took place before February 
2005. NFR, and some of their members on their own initiatives,113 have released 
recommendations based on the annual reports to Parliament (Stortingsmelding) and 
have been involved with promoting the need for stricter arms export controls in the 
media, as well as direct lobbying. They initiated a working group to work specifically 
on these issues, arguing for greater transparency, for the introduction of end user 
certificates as a requirement for all license applications, and generally for a greater 
ability to avoid the potential of Norwegian arms being used for aggression, human 
rights violations and other atrocities.114 The first document available from the group 
was a recommendation based on the report to Parliament number 35 in 2003.  
 
The campaign for stricter arms export controls gained momentum in 2005, as 
Amnesty International Norway initiated activities under the auspices of the Control 
Arms Campaign in collaboration with Norwegian Church Aid. The combined size and 
force of these two major organisations pushed the arms export control issue higher up 
on the agenda. The first significant contribution from Amnesty to the Norwegian arms 
export debate was a demonstration 26 February 2005, held under the Control Arms 
banner.115 It called for Norwegian endorsement of the ATT, based on the lethal 
statistics of international firearms-related deaths. Additionally, they utilised in their 
argumentation the fact that Finland, as a neighbouring country, was at the forefront of 
this development.116  
 
The main point of contention between the arms control activists in Norway and the 
Norwegian authorities has been the policy towards arms transfers to NATO countries. 
Essentially, NGOs are concerned with how the Norwegian policy towards arms export 
to allied states is based on the rationale that military alliances are to be built on trust, 
removing the need for making demands or asking questions related to the sale of 
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weapons to an ally.117 Thus, it is not considered necessary to ask for end user 
certificates when an arms transfer is destined for an allied state partner. This stance 
leads to two challenges to the perceived consistency of the policy, which is the 
background for much of this NGO-based criticism, which will be explained below. 
 
The trust invested in NATO countries and other allies means that there is usually no 
need for a renewed consideration of the security situation of the state in question 
when an application for an export licence is considered.118 Similarly, no questions are 
asked nor any restrictions made regarding where and how the recipient put the 
weapons to use.119 The NGO community often points to the fact that NATO countries 
account for about 80% of Norwegian strategic exports,120 accusing the government of 
giving issues of financial gain and protection of employment greater priority than 
protection of human rights and stability.121 As Norwegian exports to the US increased 
significantly between 2002 and 2003, this argument became more forceful. The NFR 
argued that “the value of Norwegian arms export appears to be dependent on the level 
of aggression in the foreign policies of our close allies. Food for thought for a peace 
nation?”122  
 
The two different voices of the NGO community on this case, represented by NFR 
and Amnesty, complement each other by focusing on different aspects of the validity 
and necessity of stricter export controls in general and specifically the adoption of an 
Arms Trade Treaty. Broadly speaking, it can be observed that NFR focuses on the 
need for universal demands for end user certificates based partly on the behaviour of 
other NATO countries and partly on existing obligations within arms trade 
agreements, especially the EU Code of Conduct. Amnesty International on the other 




 Exemplified by a report launched in 2006 by Amnesty International and the Norwegian Church Aid, 
as a part of their campaign, which was connected to the international Control Arms Campaign of which 
Amnesty International is a leading organisation. Marsh, Nicholas and Kyrre Holm; Bullets Without 
Borders, Amnesty International and Norwegian Church Aid 2006, pp.48-53. Norges Fredsråd also 
focuses on the NATO issue, for example in this recommendation: Norges Fredsråds Innstilling til 
Stortingsmelding 41, p. 1-3, available from http://www.nowar.no/documents/stmld41_nfr.doc.   
118
 Stortingsmelding nr. 41 (2003-2004) para. 4.1, p. 15. 
119
 Stortingsmelding nr. 36 (2004-2005) para. 3.3, p.12. 
120
 Stortingsmelding nr. 36 (2004-2005), p. 1. 
121
 Oksnes, Linda; Vår Lønnsomme Våpeneksport (Our Profitable Arms Export), in Ikkevold no. 2/04, 
available from http://www.nowar.no/documents/lindaoksnes.doc.  
   46 
hand focused on the devastating effects of especially small arms around the world and 
the desirability of limiting their proliferation through the implementation of the ATT. 
Their call was primarily based on the need for Norway to work for this internationally 
and less on the Norwegian behaviour, without ignoring this aspect altogether.  
 
Both fractions utilised the Norwegian image as a “humanitarian superpower” in their 
rhetoric. NFR makes this point in their argument for an expanded use of end user 
certification: “Norway as a peace nation: It is essential that Norway at least attempts 
to be at the forefront in this field if it is to stand a chance at being taken seriously in is 
role as a peace nation and an international peace negotiator.”123  
Amnesty exemplifies their point by quoting a war-ridden Somali’s reaction to the 
opposition in the Norwegian MFA towards the ATT initiative: “That Norway, who 
gives great amounts of foreign aid, who works for the rights of women in conflict, 
who is portrayed abroad as a peace negotiator, doesn’t support the Arms Trade Treaty 
Initiative has to be an absurd contradiction.”124  
 
In particular, the war in Iraq illustrated the aspects of the Norwegian arms export 
policy towards NATO which the NGOs find problematic, and is thus a case which 
will assist in demonstrating the foundations for calls for stricter, more human rights-
sensitive arms export regulations, as these demands are being put forward by elements 
of the NGO community. In Norway, the government expressed doubts about the 
legality of the war,125 which provided a welcome foundation for the NGO community 
to launch arguments about Norwegian double standards given that arms exports to the 
invading powers continued.126 As Norway saw a broad-based public opposition to the 
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war dominating the domestic discourse, the media attention towards acts undermining 
this opposition was significant, especially cases of Norwegian military equipment 
being rented out to the coalition forces.127  
 
NFR took the opportunity to utilise the discontent surrounding the ambiguous 
attitudes of the government towards Norwegian involvement in Iraq to criticise the 
existing export control mechanisms. The organisation held that this situation was a 
reason for reconsidering the NATO policy in the arms export regulations, as a war 
that was in violation of international law was being fought by two close allies that are 
major recipients of Norwegian arms.128 It based this argument partly on the fact that 
basing a policy on trust when it has been proven that this trust is sometimes 
unfounded, but also on what they consider to be existing obligations within the EU 
Code of Conduct. “The EU Code of Conduct for Arms Exports of the 8 June 1998 can 
reasonably be interpreted towards an obligation to demand end user certifications in 
arms transactions.”129    
 
This argument was based on Criterion 7 of the Code, which was shown in sub-chapter 
3.3.2 not to include a specific demand for this use of en user certification. Thus, the 
NFR utilises existing international commitments in a combination with public 
discontent with governmental policies that threatened the image of Norway as a peace 
nation.  
 
As article 5 in the North Atlantic Treaty clearly states that the exercise of collective 
self defence is to be as “recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations”, the American aggression towards Iraq seems to fall outside of the scope of 
the NATO partnership. This is significant for the strength of the NGO arguments 
about Norwegian double standards. While a situation of legitimate self-defence by a 
NATO country will invoke the collective self-defence clause130 and thus arguably 
make transfers of weapons between allies legitimate regardless of the situation of war, 
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this clause is not invoked in a case of illegal aggression, which this invasion was 
generally perceived as by NGOs and political parties in Norway. In such cases, the 
founding principle of Norwegian arms exports131 should logically lead to the 
conclusion that no transfers should be made to the invading states. The issue for the 
NGOs, however, is that the law, regulations and practice as they stand do not demand 
an evaluation of the political situation of an ally in the case of an application for 
export licenses. One can of course still theoretically make such demands. However, 
the very basis for the decision not to make such demands towards allied states makes 
it highly unlikely that such demands will be made. Significantly, there are no 
mechanisms ensuring that re-evaluations of the relevant political situation are made 
vis-à-vis the allied recipient state when exceptional situations such as the attack on 
Iraq takes place. This is a significant point of criticism especially from the peace 
movement, as seen in the article Norsk og Internasjonal Våpenhandel written by Stian 
Christensen, member of the board of Norges Fredsråd. Here, the lack of scrutiny and 
debate around transfers to the UK, the United States and Australia immediately prior 
to and during the war was heavily criticised.132  
 
The second issue receiving attention from the NGO community related to exports to 
allies is the question of re-exports. Norwegian guidelines and practice suggest that it 
is not necessary to demand an end-user certificate for exports to so-called “list 1” 
states, based on the inherent trust on which alliances and cooperation with these 
countries is founded. The NFR has raised doubts as to whether Norway can trust that 
its allies applies the same standards to arms exports as is laid out in Norwegian arms 
export regulations and in international standard-setting documents that Norway has 
committed itself to.133 In 2004, Norway denied requests for export licenses to 14 
destinations. This information has only been available in the last two export reports, 
namely report 41 (2003-2004) and report 36 (2004-2005), and the information 
provided is very limited. It lists the countries to which exports were denied, but not 
the reasons for the refusal or which goods the license application covered. 
Additionally, the report stresses that the denial of a licence should not be seen as an 
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effective halt in exports to the country in question, and that each case is considered on 
its merits. For a reader of the report however, it is impossible to get an insight into 
these merits.  
 
NFR has on several occasions raised this issue in articles and recommendations. They 
have pointed to several allied states that are involved in arms exports to states which 
Norway does not export arms to, and that are likely to be ineligible on account of 
insufficient respect for human rights. They have especially been concerned with 
exports from the United States to Colombia, Israel and other states with a problematic 
human rights record.134 While not being able to prove that Norwegian weapons have 
been re-exported, the NFR frames its criticism in terms of risk, and in terms of the 
degree to which the existing control framework is sufficient for allowing the 
government to prevent such re-exports from taking place.  
 
The international campaign for an Arms Trade Treaty and the domestic lobbying, 
initially dominated by the NFR, did stir a limited debate in the Norwegian Parliament. 
Primarily, challenges to the government, dominated by the Conservative Party, came 
from representatives from the Socialist Left Party. In a question to the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, dated 27 October 2003, Representative Ingrid Opedal enquired about 
the government’s attitude towards the need for a new, legally binding Arms Trade 
Treaty, and about their views on the present draft.135  The response from the 
government was evasive, as they stated that it would be more productive to 
concentrate their efforts on already existing agreements and fora. This answer thus did 
not address the merits of the draft, and did not recognise its progressive features in 
terms of the increased state responsibilities which its utilisation of existing 
international law would entail. The response from the Minister implies that he did not 
see any value added from adopting the ATT as compared to working within existing 
frameworks such as the OSCE and the EU Code of Conduct.  
 
A few weeks later, on 18 November 2003, a representative of the Socialist Left Party 
was the only parliamentarian to call for more restrictive arms export control 
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regulations.136 The arguments forwarded in this context reflected the issues raised by 
the NGO community in relation to the invasion of Iraq and the continuation of arms 
exports to the US and the UK. The representative addressed the increase in exports to 
these two countries after the invasion, and called for “an honest debate as to whether 
or not this was in violation of the law and regulations.”137      
 
In spite of expressed intentions of being at the forefront of the development of 
international norms,138 Norway was not among the states at the forefront in endorsing 
the proposal. Rather, the government focused on arguments holding that Norwegian 
arms export controls was already very strict with a strong humanitarian focus, which 
they held made this new treaty redundant in the Norwegian context. It took the 
endorsement of the ATT by several important allies before the Norwegian position 
was changed. Significantly, the Control Arms Campaign had been very vocal in the 
UK since the start of the campaign, putting significant pressure on the government. 
On 30 September 2004, Minister of Foreign Affairs Jack Straw voiced his support for 
the initiative in a public announcement.139 Thus, only when several states with which 
Norway likes to compare itself expressed their support for the treaty did the 
Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Petersen reconsider his position and came 
out in support of the ATT, on 23 June 2005.140 Norwegian NGOs utilised the position 
of the UK to pressure Petersen to follow up on Straw’s position, referring to the close 
ties between Norway and the UK to make their point.141 High-level representatives of 
Amnesty International Norway argued for Norway to come out in support of the 
British move in international fora, directly quoting the perceived peace nation image 
as being on the line if Norway did not make such commitments.142  
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-Norway often promotes itself as a peace-loving nation. An unqualified statement of 
support on this issue would help maintain that image.143 




As this sub-chapter has shown, the domestic debate changed significantly in 2005 as 
Amnesty International Norway as a member of the Control Arms Campaign started 
lobbying the Norwegian government. The effect of this was twofold. One, the 
campaign was shifted from a more technical level with focus on legal and political 
inconsistencies towards a more broad-based public awareness-raising campaign with a 
more simplified message. This part of the debate was characterised by more purely 
ethical arguments building on the Norwegian humanitarian image. Two, the campaign 
received greater media coverage, partly as a function of the broad-based campaigning 
strategy. It is still too early to assess the impact of this campaign on the behaviour of 
Norwegian authorities in the arms export question beyond the endorsement of the 
Arms trade Treaty Initiative. However, some observations can be made based on the 
last report to Parliament on arms exports, published 2 June 2006.144  
  
The report, Stortingsmelding 19 (2005-2006), which gives account of Norwegian 
export of strategic goods in 2005, differs from previous reports in some interesting 
ways. In previous reports, references to human rights have been few and general, 
mainly repeating the statement from 1997 in which it is given that the consideration of 
the political context pertaining to the recipient country should include “questions 
related to democratic rights and respect for basic human rights.”145 The new report, 
however, goes much further in discussing the role of human rights norms in arms 
export regulations. Importantly, the rhetoric has changed from the dismissive style 
exemplified above into what I interpret as an increased acceptance of the validity of 
human rights norms for arms export controls. A particularly relevant concession can 
be found in the discussion of the export regulations as such in chapter two of the 
report, after a statement emphasising that the Ministry places a great emphasis on the 
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human rights situation in the recipient country.146  “The Ministry will nevertheless 
consider whether there is an added value in codifying international humanitarian law 
and human rights as conditions in the export regulations.”147 The willingness to 
explore the possibilities for giving human rights a legal protection within the arms 
export regulations signifies a movement away from talking about human rights as 
merely an ethical standard to be considered when transfer decisions are made. Rather, 
it represents a move towards accepting the legal relevance of human rights law for 
arms export regulations. One interesting observation can be made in this context. This 
concession may represent a move towards accepting the broader scope of human 
rights obligations as argued for by Barbara Frey. Codifying human rights law in 
domestic arms export regulations represents an expanded notion of responsibility for 
the potential extra-territorial implications of arms transfers on a recipient country.   
 
The report also includes an official expression of the endorsement of the Arms Trade 
Treaty,148 though without providing any insight into the future implications this 
document may have on Norwegian arms export regulations, nor any indication that 
the endorsement has had any effect on the present arms export practice.  
 
5.2 Analysing the norm implementation process. 
The present Norwegian arms transfer regulations can be traced back to 1959, when 
Parliament unanimously voted in favour of a proposition from the government. The 
statement voted for in Parliament held that arms would not be exported to war zones 
or high-risk areas, and additionally that the political situation in the recipient state 
should be taken into account, as seen in sub-chapter 3.1. This loose framework was 
then to be interpreted and regulated by the lawmakers. Arms exports were mainly 
considered a strategic tool, and were for the most part regulated accordingly during 
the cold war. This is of course a simplification, however at an aggregated level one 
can say that human rights started becoming important in the 1990’s, as security 
politics were no longer polarised and the division between who is an ally and who is 
an enemy became more blurred, as argued by Sikkink and referred to in sub-chapter 
2.4.1.   
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As one recalls from chapter 3, the adoption of the OSCE Principles Governing 
Conventional Arms Transfers of 1993 was the first explicit sign of human rights being 
given a role in Norwegian arms transfer policy, if only as a non-binding standard of 
behaviour. This incorporation is an early sign of human rights as a principled idea 
gaining ground in the sphere of arms export regulations. There are no requirements in 
the OSCE Principles that call for national Parliaments to be informed about the details 
of the domestic arms transfers. There is, however, a general call for transparency,149 
which may have had an effect on the Norwegian choice to start reporting on arms 
transfers.150 However, only as late as 1996 was a report on Norwegian arms exports 
debated in Parliament, during which debate a representative of the Socialist Left Party 
(SV) voiced a concern for a lack of protection of human rights in the regulations.151 
The Foreign Affairs Committee (Utenrikskomiteen) received reports from the MFA 
yearly from 1996. However, there was little activity and involvement from the 
parliamentarians before 2002. Only two political parties chose to include additional 
remarks in the response sent back to the MFA between 1996 and 2001.152 Some 
debate arose on a few occasions over case-specific transfers, most notably the sale of 
Penguin missiles to Turkey. However, in terms of debating the foundations of the 
arms export regulations the debate was limited before 2002. Thus, it can be observed 
a time lag between the international role of human rights as a principled idea relevant 
to arms export controls and the domestic parliamentarian attention devoted to this 
development.  
 
Two other significant events are worth mentioning in the Norwegian arms control 
discourse in the 1990s. First, in 1997, through a statement from the government, 
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endorsed by Parliament, human rights was officially included as an element to be 
taken into consideration in arms transfer decisions. This was discussed in sub-chapter 
3.1. Then, in 1998, Norway endorsed the European Union Code of Conduct for Arms 
Transfers, as discussed in sub-chapter 3.3.2. Two things are especially interesting here 
in light of the process of norm implementation. First, the 1997 statement seems to 
appear out of a vacuum. Some time had passed since the OSCE Principles had been 
signed, and there was, as described above, no particularly strong debate in Parliament 
around the issue beyond the comments from the Socialist Left Party. Additionally, as 
seen in sub-chapter 4.4, the mainstream NGO community was yet to take an interest 
in the subject. Second, the statement appeared before the conclusion and endorsement 
of the Code of Conduct. It may still be reasonable to expect that the Code of Conduct 
was relevant for the issuing of this statement, as the Norwegian MFA knew about the 
French/British initiative to establish a Code of Conduct within the EU.153  This, in 
combination with how Norway one year later expressed voluntary commitment to the 
Code of Conduct in spite of not being a member of the EU could be understood as a 
need to be in line with important European allies on this issue. The initial attempts at 
mainstreaming human rights in the domestic arms control regulations thus seemed to 
be based more on international pressure than on domestic lobbying, given that this as 
mentioned was rather marginal at this time. This implies that at this point, the major 
driving forces behind Norwegian development in the field of arms export controls 
were related to the world time situation and the Norwegian national interest to be 
perceived as being in line with allies, or possibly ahead on human rights related 
issues.  
 
Interestingly, no discernable difference could be found in Norwegian arms export 
regulations after making this concession. In fact, when discussing the Code of 
Conduct in the annual report to Parliament, the MFA expressly stated that they saw no 
obligations arising under the Code not already covered by existing regulations, and 
thus no need for making any changes to these regulations.154  
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The NFR reports and the criticism therein were based on the 2003 Stortingsmelding. 
Interestingly, in the next Stortingsmelding155 it was stated that the 8 criteria in the EU 
code was already protected within the Norwegian regulations and that “It is therefore 
considered to be unnecessary to explicitly include the eight criteria in the Norwegian 
regulations in order to ensure enforcement.”156 I find the fact that the MFA was 
compelled to emphasise how they didn’t see a need for further implementation of the 
criteria of the Code in the existing regulations to support my theoretically founded 
expectations. This act appears to be an example of the authorities attempting to avoid 
further concessions to be given as a result of pressure mounting from the initial 
rhetorical move consisting of the endorsement of the Code. This situation also 
illustrates a tendency in the arms control activist community generally to interpret the 
texts of the international arrangements as going further than what may be covered by 
the text, as illustrated by the statement from the NFR above.  
 
There has not been any significant movement in the position of human rights in the 
Norwegian arms export control system after the 1997 statement. Seeing this statement 
as a rhetorical concession based on the international climate at the time seems to have 
its merits in this context. This refers not only to the documents emerging in the arms 
export control sector which incorporated human rights concerns, but also the general 
position of human rights in international relations as discussed by Sikkink.157 
However, the concessions represented by this statement, in addition to the support for 
the international documents in question, gave the activists in Norway a platform on 
which to voice their concern with what they saw as still unsolved problems with 
Norwegian arms exports. Internationally, a new phase in the discourse on human 
rights and arms exports began around 2002. In fact, this may be seen as the starting 
point for a real enquiry, initiated by Barbara Frey and adopted by the Control Arms 
Campaign, into the proper position of human rights norms and laws in the arms 
transfer regulations. The EU Code of Conduct and the OSCE Principles as discussed 
above incorporated human rights, but without discussing the legal significance of 
doing so, or exploring the potential nexus between arms transfers and human rights 
violations empirically. The first significant attempts at this were the documents of 
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Barbara Frey, as discussed in chapter five. Building on the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility of the International Law Commission, her work emphasises the 
potential for arms transfers to be in violation of international law when they have the 
potential for assisting in human rights violations. I consider this work as essential for 
establishing the role of human rights as a principled idea relevant to arms export 
regulations, as it establishes this connection based on interpretations of existing legal 
documents and principles.  
 
This logic is subsequently found in the arguments from the Control Arms Campaign, 
especially in the campaign’s arguments for the draft Arms Trade Treaty.158 Here, the 
development of the discourse of arms export controls in international organisations 
preceded the development of arguments in the international NGO-community, which 
in my view added legitimacy to the arguments of the campaign. It has been an 
important part of the lobbying and awareness raising efforts of campaigners that the 
new legal text, the previously discussed Arms Trade Treaty, would be based on 
existing legal obligations. The validity of this perspective relies crucially on the work 
of the ILC and the Special Rapporteur. The subsequent practical importance of the 
works of these UN bodies however relied to a significant degree on the NGO 
community in order to exercise an influence over states’ foreign policies. The first 
changes in state rhetoric and behaviour that reflected the arguments of the report of 
the Special Rapporteur came as a response to the Control Arms Campaign, as 
different governments started voicing support for the proposed Arms Trade Treaty. 
This signified a public endorsement of the principles of complicity and due diligence 
as put forth by Ms. Frey and utilised by the campaigners. Initially, states with a 
comparatively limited international influence voiced their support, for example Mali 
and Costa Rica. They were followed by Finland and the Netherlands among others, 
bringing support for the treaty closer to the Norwegian sphere.159  
 
The NGO community has considered the endorsement of the Arms Trade Treaty a 
victory. However, no change has been made towards greater mainstreaming of human 
rights in the Norwegian export policies since the statement incorporating human rights 
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was adopted in 1997. In an interview with the author, Jan Grevstad of the Export 
Council maintained that there had not been any change in the guidelines they received 
from the political leadership of the MFA after the endorsement of the proposed treaty. 
In other words, while Norway supports the establishment of a new treaty, no efforts 
has been made to make domestic behaviour consistent with the principles which the 
endorsement of this document represents support of. 
   
Is it possible to discern a pattern in the way Norwegian political rhetoric and 
behaviour has changed with regards to the position of human rights in arms control 
policies? The OSCE principles can be seen as a starting point from which the 
participating states initiated a discursive trend within which human rights norms 
gained importance for arms export policies. As the document formulated among the 
members and as such a result of negotiations, compromises and consensus, it is 
uncontroversial as a normative starting point. However, the picture changes somewhat 
in the case of Norway. As Norway chose voluntarily to adhere to the Code, this 
adherence carries greater significance in terms of the behavioural and rhetorical 
change it represents. I see this move as a reflection of the need to be in line with the 
European community on questions regarding human rights, especially when the issue 
at stake is progressive compared to earlier policies. The fact that the expression of 
adherence in this context was pro-active, especially if one notes that non-adherence 
was unlikely to carry with it any sanctions or even criticism given that Norway is not 
a member of the EU, illustrates the importance in Norwegian foreign policy of being 
at the forefront of progressive developments of international law and agreements.  
 
The importance of adherence to the Code is unclear, with at least two interpretations. 
One perspective is that as the Code is only politically binding, and as Norway is less 
than a full member of this political community, voicing support for this document did 
not need to carry any significance for the organisation of Norwegian arms exports. 
This notion is supported by the previously noted formulation in the reports to 
Parliament which rejects in a rather casual way any need for changes to Norwegian 
arms export regulations based on the commitment to the Code, offering no further 
argument or explanation. Another perspective maintains that one can see the 
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importance of the Code in that it represents further rhetorical concessions, creating a 
platform for subsequent lobbying and political pressure.  
 
One year before the completion of the Code, human rights were explicitly introduced 
to Norwegian arms export policy through the unanimously adopted statement from the 
government specifying how this was allowed for under the wording “foreign and 
domestic political considerations.” This can be seen as a domestic concession 
reflecting the existing OSCE principles and the forthcoming Code, the rough content 
of which was already known. However, I interpret this statement to be a mainly a 
tactical concession, as it does not codify the role human rights should play, nor did it 
lead to any change in laws, regulations or guidelines. Hence, while this statement does 
represent the starting point for mainstreaming of human rights in Norwegian arms 
export controls, it was mainly relevant as a signal of acceptance of the relevance of 
human rights norms in general for this political area. The discussion above points 
towards the importance of the code as a platform for NGO pressure as it was seen as a 
codification of the Norwegian position. Thus, the Code has been of importance 
beyond the limited obligations associated with endorsing it.  
 
Interestingly, these concessions seem not to have produced any significant attempts 
by the NGO community at further pressure towards behavioural change in Norway. 
The Control Arms Campaign only really got started as late as 2002, coinciding with 
the reports of the Special Rapporteur. Thus, further international development 
establishing the role of human rights as a principled idea relevant for arms export 
controls appeared to be necessary for the Norwegian NGO community to get 
involved.  
 
Once these concessions together with the internationally developed principles were 
utilised by the NGO community, the Norwegian government needed to address the 
challenge of the arguments founded on these developments. Initially, the main 
rhetoric consisted of insisting on keeping the arms trade control harmonisation efforts 
to the already existing agreements and fora, as discussed in sub-chapter 4.4.2. At the 
same time, Norway tied its efforts in arms export controls to its image as a peace 
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nation, with the ambition to be at the forefront of efforts to increase control over 
international arms trade.160 The arms control activists built their case on the very same 
foundation; the Norwegian image of itself as a leading nation within peace and 
humanitarian issues. This made the government more vulnerable for the pressure from 
the NGO community, as their arguments built on the positions taken and defended by 
the state organs. When Petersen finally decided to express his support for the ATT on 
behalf of his government, this came to a certain degree after NGO pressure, however I 
find it unlikely that this concession would have come about at this time without the 
concession of especially the British, but to a lesser degree also the Finnish and Dutch 
governments. Looking at the history of the arms export control question in the 
Norwegian context, most significant change has come about as a result of changes in 
the international discourse and especially in the positions of key allies.   
 
The endorsement of the ATT has been utilised by the NGO community to demand 
further concessions in practice and regulations. Amnesty International and Norwegian 
Church Aid have argued that this endorsement implies that”Norway should develop 
its own legislation and ensure that it explicitly includes reference to relevant 
international law.”161 There have not been any developments towards such a change in 
the domestic regulations. In an interview with the author, Jan Grevstad of the Section 
for Export Control states that the regulations will not be re-evaluated before a possible 
treaty is implemented. The NGOs have thus adopted an understanding of human 
rights as a principled idea which should guide arms export controls, building on 
international developments justifying such a position, before the state either in 
rhetoric or in practice fully endorses this interpretation.  
 
However, the recent developments represented by the changed rhetoric in the latest 
report to Parliament suggest a modification of this statement. Though the ATT is not 
specifically mentioned in the relevant section of the report, the expressed intention of 
considering a codification of relevant international law in domestic regulations echoes 
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the arguments from the Control Arms Campaign, as discussed in sub-chapter 4.4.2. 
Welcoming such an evaluation may thus represent a case in which the initially 
unbinding endorsement of the ATT has functioned as a rhetorical entrapment which 
may at a later stage contribute to a real change in regulations and behaviour. 
 
The concessions included in the last report have several implications for the validity 
of the theoretical model. First, they represent a significant step towards real norm 
adherence and acceptance of the validity of human rights norms for the sphere of arms 
exports. Second, the wording of the concession on possible implementation of human 
rights norms in domestic regulations provides a strong foundation for further pressure 
by NGOs towards the realisation of the potential of such implementation. The 
expressed intention of exploring the value added of this implementation may be 
perceived by the NGOs who have been advocating the validity of human rights norm 
implementation in arms export regulations over the last years as an invitation to 
dialogue on the matter. Additionally, the report goes further in discussing the policy 
on not requiring end user certificates for transfers to allied countries than earlier 
reports have done. The principle of trust is not challenged, nevertheless one point of 
concession should be emphasised. On page 11 of the report, the MFA informs “The 
Ministry recently initiated a dialogue with a number of allies with a view to clarify the 
conditions that are placed on end user controls.” While not directly discussing the 
trust-based policy, this statement nevertheless appears as an acknowledgement of the 
importance of what these states do with weapons received from Norway. In terms of 
real change in regulations, this concession signifies a potential for the first 
codification of the mainstreaming of human rights in Norwegian arms exports, which 
was initiated as a policy intention. This acknowledgement may serve as a future 
platform for challenges from the NGO community against the policy towards allied 
states.   
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6 Conclusion 
Norway is often considered to be a leading nation in the international quest for greater 
human rights accountability, and is a state in which foreign policy credentials are 
intimately tied to its role as a peace mediator and defender of humanitarian values. 
Most of all, this is the image preferred by the Norwegian authorities when asked about 
how they wish Norway to be conceived abroad. Against this background, it could be 
expected that it is in the interest of the Norwegian state to be at the forefront of the 
process of mainstreaming of human rights. Based on these presumptions, I formulated 
the following hypothesis:    
 
The evolving role of human rights norms in Norwegian arms export controls can be 
explained through utilising an adaptation of the spiral model developed by Thomas 
Risse et.al. 
 
I expected to find a structure of norm implementation that was based on the role of 
human rights as a principled idea in Norwegian foreign policy and a movement 
towards applying this to arms export regulations. This would in that case be an 
example of mainstreaming of human rights where this norm set was included as a 
relevant category in a new field of policy. Significantly, I expected the process of 
norm implementation to follow a logic of entrapment in which the government would 
initially give rhetorical concessions in line with expectations tied to their image as a 
“humanitarian superpower.” These concessions would then be utilised by the NGO 
community in order to push for further concessions including behavioural change.  
 
The analysis over the past chapters should give an indication as to whether and to 
which degree these expectations were realised. I took as my starting point the 
adoption of the OSCE Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers, as this was 
the first multilateral arms transfer document to mention human rights as a relevant 
norm set, and also because the endorsement of this document was the first 
introduction of human rights to the Norwegian sphere of arms export regulations. 
Recall that this was a multilateral agreement, reached by consensus based on 
negotiations. Significantly, its formulations are weak and demands for follow-up are 
limited to a general call for information sharing. Thus, as a starting point for a 
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redefinition of what ought to be the basic foundations for arms transfer controls, this 
document represents a desire for regional harmonisation based on criteria that reflects 
the changed nature of international politics after the Cold War. This is in line with the 
observations made by Kathryn Sikkink regarding the increased role for the idea of 
human rights in European foreign policy following the shift in perspectives as the 
political paradigm of the Cold War lost significance.  
 
The timing of the 1997 declaration from the Norwegian government stating that 
human rights considerations should be an integral part of transfer licensing 
considerations may appear rather awkward. It was neither preceded nor followed by 
any significant domestic debate in Parliament, nor significant NGO pressure or media 
attention. The most noteworthy change in the relevant political environment was the 
knowledge of the French/British initiative on a European Code of Conduct which 
aimed at harmonising European arms transfer regulations in a framework of notably 
greater political force than that of the OSCE Principles. Thus, the rationale for making 
such an apparently significant and unprovoked concession can be found in the desire 
to anticipate international developments. In line with the logic of the adapted model, 
this may have the following possible explanatory factors. One, it may be related to the 
image which Norway wishes to portray, namely one of a state at the forefront of 
international developments regarding protection of human rights and humanitarian 
values. Two, it could conceivably be that the limited domestic change, which one 
must keep in mind was a rather weak one given that it was not followed by changes to 
the existing law or regulations, was made with the notion that it could prevent further 
calls for domestic restrictions in arms export regulations once the Code was in place. 
Such an explanation incorporates the image-related explanation in that it suggests a 
conflict between the national interest related to Norway’s international image, the 
perceived national interest invested in the arms industry, and the desire to retain as 
much control as possible over this sphere.  
 
The next significant step in the evolution of the relationship between Norwegian arms 
exports and human rights norm came with the endorsement of the proposed Arms 
Trade Treaty in June 2005. The context of this change was different from the situation 
of the 1997 declaration in that it was preceded by several years of significant NGO 
activities pushing not only for further restrictions in the arms export sector, but 
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specifically for Norwegian support for the Arms Trade Treaty. As early as 2003, NFR 
produced a recommendation to Parliament on the occasion of their evaluation of the 
annual Stortingsmelding on arms exports. This recommendation included references 
to the proposed Arms Trade Treaty as well as suggestions towards bringing 
Norwegian export controls into compliance with the EU Code of Conduct. Amnesty 
International and subsequently other NGOs got involved at a somewhat later stage, 
early in 2005. The way in which these organisations utilised previous concessions 
given by the government in combination with arguments related to the Norwegian 
image as a “humanitarian superpower” in order to make their case ought according to 
theoretical expectations to have a significant impact. Still, the sudden change in 
rhetoric from the Minister of Foreign Affairs represented by the endorsement of the 
ATT was hard to predict. The government had been denying for some time any 
leading role for Norway in making the treaty a reality,162 and had received criticism 
both from the NGO community and elements of the opposition on this.163  
 
There are again several likely interplaying factors that can explain this change in 
governmental rhetoric. The significant lobbying from the NGO community surely 
plays an important role in this. Combined with the fact that this was an election year 
and the most vocal opposition parties were starting to utilise the attention given to the 
debate in order to challenge the incumbent parties, this is likely to have created 
pressure for the government to make these concessions in an attempt to curb the 
debate and the attention given to the subject. Another very important element is the 
fact that the UK, as an important Norwegian ally, had expressed support for and 
intentions to take a leading role in the promotion of the proposed treaty. While this 
significantly predated the Norwegian endorsement, there are grounds for suggesting 
that the behaviour of the British government made it much easier for Norway to make 
these commitments.  
 
The last remaining question is thus: How helpful was the adapted spiral model in 
explaining the evolution of the role of human rights norms in the Norwegian arms 
export regulations?   
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The analytical strength of the adapted version of the model is that it captures the 
mechanisms that allow for NGO pressure to translate into real change in state 
behaviour. Additionally, the concept of world time could be utilised in understanding 
the role played by the general international climate dominating a specific issue. The 
weakness, however, is in that the model does not incorporate the strategic importance 
that may follow from being in line with certain states on important issues of foreign 
policy. The fact that the model was initially meant for situations of domestic change 
in states that were out of line with the western states on issues of democracy and 
human rights to some degree precludes this. In cases such as the present one, where 
states that are already part of the “norm abiding” group are developing their policies 
towards greater norm adherence or a broader understanding of the scope of 
application of human rights norms, this seems to be of importance to the development 
of the process.  
 
The case of Norway suggests that the mechanisms of norm implementation upon 
which the model builds also applies to “norm-abiding” states in which norm 
entrepreneurs are seeking to expand the scope of application of human rights norms. 
Some observations do however suggest a slight diversion from what would have been 
expected when utilising the adapted model. Most importantly, it may appear that the 
most significant explanatory factor for new concessions and political change has been 
the discursive climate in important allied states, or in the regional community with 
which Norway identifies. This is especially true when considering the 1997 
declaration which coincided with knowledge of the development of new guidelines 
among important allies, and which was not preceded by significant media attention, 
NGO pressure or parliamentary debate. The endorsement of the Arms Trade Treaty 
came at a time that is somewhat harder to clearly define. The NGO and media 
attention was strongly present, in addition to the fact that several important allies, 
most notably the UK, had already expressed their support for the initiative. On this 
occasion, it is likely that the combination of NGO pressure and the upcoming election 
triggered the concession. However, without the existing support of the UK, Finland 
and other states, I hold it to be unlikely that the outcome would have remained the 
same. For the NGOs, a combination of arguments drawing on the Norwegian image as 
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a humanitarian superpower and on positions taken by strategically important allies 
seems to have been the most potent recipe for change.  
 
The success of applying the adapted spiral model to the case of implementation of 
human rights norms in Norwegian arms export controls has thus been limited. It has 
proven helpful in explaining how NGO pressure can assist in making the state endorse 
international commitments. However, beyond the 1997 declaration there has not been 
any significant changes to Norwegian regulations or behaviour. Thus, the model is of 
limited value in explaining the way in which these changes come about. The main 
explanatory factor for the most significant changes in Norway is the international 
context, a combination of what Risse brands as world time and the protection of the 
national interest invested in the Norwegian image as a peace-nation. NGO pressure 
may based on this be expected to be more forceful in calling for changes in behaviour 
and adoption of a new norm set if the NGO rhetoric is based on an existing 
international discourse defining what is the progressive position on the given issue. 
Additionally, lobbying and argumentation has a greater chance of succeeding if it 
coincides with a favourable attitude among important allies on the validity of the 
norms in question.    
 
This thesis has provided an initial framework for discussing the process of norm 
implementation in arms export regulations. This is an early effort which explores the 
role of human rights in domestic arms export regulations from a new perspective. 
Exploring this field is essential for understanding the redefinition of the role of arms 
export controls in general, and the process of mainstreaming of human rights in this 
field of policy in general, Hence, there is a need for further research on this topic, and 
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